Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - ETO - AP 156: Battle of Britain - 1. Organisation
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. Air Ministry Pamphlet 156; Issued by the Department of the Air Member for Training, August 1943
MACHINERY OF OPERATION
I. Organization
Fighter Command
At the time of the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command was organized into four Fighter Groups. Each group was, for purposes of tactical control, subdivided geographically into a number of sectors. A sector consisted of a main fighter station and airfield, sector headquarters and operations room, also one or more satellite or forward airfields upon which were based a number of squadrons varying in accordance with the situation and the need for good dispersal.
No. 11 Group's area covered South-East England and, consequently, it was this group which bore the brunt of the fighting, although other groups extensively reinforced the air battle from time to time and, in addition, fed into No. 11 Group a regular supply of fresh squadrons to relieve those worn down by intensive air fighting.
Operations Rooms
The heart of each headquarters at command, groups, and sectors, was its operations room. This varied somewhat in size and complexity depending upon the scope and function of the headquarters and upon the amount of detail regarding our own squadrons that it was necessary for the commander to have before him; but the ultimate object of all operations rooms remained the same, namely, to ensure the utmost rapidity in the issue of orders. For time was the essence of the problem; with machines of war moving at the rate of 5 miles a minute, the issue of written orders was out of the question and the only possible course was to cut the length of orders to a minimum and to use direct telephone, whether landline or radio. To effect this, the operations room had, first, to portray physically the movements of enemy aircraft and, where necessary, of our own fighters, over the whole country and the sea approaches thereto (or such part as was appropriate to the headquarters concerned); secondly, to show how soon and in what strength our own squadrons could leave the ground; and, thirdly, to provide an adequate and reasonably secure network of communications both by landline and radio telephony.
Air Raid Intelligence
The essential basis of any air defence system is, of course, a good air-raid intelligence system. In this country, during the Battle of Britain, as now, such a system comprised a chain of radio location stations sited around our coasts. The function of these stations was the detection of all aircraft approaching this country over the sea. This early warning was vital since the German Air Force was in occupation of airfields just the other side of the Straits of Dover, which could be crossed in four or five minutes. It was supplemented over the land by the Observer Corps, whose function was to take over and `tell on' the tracks of all aircraft as they crossed our coasts and proceeded inland to their targets.
During the Battle of Britain, information received by radio location was transmitted to Fighter Command headquarters and after passing through a `filter room' was telephoned direct to one of the plotters in the Command operations room and simultaneously to those at the group and sectors affected. Information received from the Observer Corps followed the reverse course, being passed through observer centres to fighter groups and sectors and repeated by the group tellers to Fighter Command and adjacent groups.
Display of Information
In all Fighter Command operation rooms was a large table map upon which this air-raid intelligence could be accurately plotted as tracks, after such tracks had been identified as hostile, friendly or doubtful. Seated round the table map were a number of plotters, each one connected by a landline to the appropriate reporting centre. From these centres the plotters received minute-to-minute information of the progress of enemy aircraft towards and over this country, together with their numbers and height. The plotter displayed on the table map suitable symbols indicating the identity, numbers, height and track of the aircraft concerned. Thus each R.A.F. commander, from the Commanderin-Chief in his operations room at Fighter Command down to the sector commander in his operations room at a fighter station or airfield, had continually before him the same moving picture of the enemy as the situation continually changed at the speed of modern flight. Naturally the area that had to be covered by the picture presented to a Sector Commander was much smaller than the area required for the command or group operations room, but in so far as their responsibilities were severally affected, it was the same picture.
During the heavy attacks in September it was found that in No. 11 Group Headquarters operations room the table got too congested, so all detail regarding enemy raids and the fighter squadrons detailed to intercept was transferred to a slotted black-board on the wall known as the Totalisator, leaving the map clear except for the raid numbers and symbols for our squadrons in the air.
Each operations room contained an elevated dais which might extend much of the way round the room; a gallery was sometimes added between the dais and the floor of the room. On the wall was shown complete meteorological information including wind and clouds and, at groups and sectors, the strength and degree of readiness of our own squadrons. In sector operations rooms arrangements existed whereby the minute-to-minute position of our own fighters was also plotted on the table map.
Transmission of Information and Orders
In the centre of the dais sat the controller with his assistants responsible for the issue of orders. In the gallery or on the dais sat the tellers who passed on the information appearing on the table map to plotters in other operations rooms. Accommodation on the dais was provided for representatives of the Observer Corps, A.A. guns and searchlights and the Ministry of Home Security. Very complete intercommunication was provided; for instance, the controller in a group operations room could, by moving a switch, speak directly to any of his sectors, and the controller in a sector operations room could speak through R/T with any of his squadrons in the air or at their dispersal points on the ground.
At Fighter Command headquarters was the main operations room. In addition to the Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command and his staff, it contained the Commander-in-Chief A.A. Defences and the Observer Corps Commandant, or their representatives, liaison officers from the Admiralty, Bomber and Coastal Commands, as well as a Home Security official. It fulfilled many functions. Information from the various sources was coordinated and analysed and the reported formation identified as friendly or hostile and, if the latter, was allotted a number. Where any doubt existed as to the responsibility, raids were allotted to groups. The air raid warning system was operated through certain trunk exchanges in direct telephone communication. The Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command exercised general control over the opening of A.A. gunfire and the exposure of search-lights, through the Commander-in-Chief, A.A. Command. He also controlled the balloon barrage through his group commanders. Group commanders decided which sector should meet any specified raid and the strength of the fighter force to be employed. Sector commanders detailed the fighter units.
Responsibility of Commanders
This system enabled R.A.F. commanders at each different level immediately to dispose their air forces to meet any situation as it could be seen threatening or developing before his eyes on the table map. It enabled the Commander-in-Chief to reinforce groups with fighters from an adjacent group as and when he saw where the weight of the enemy's attack was likely to fall. It enabled a group commander to organize his squadrons in the various sectors at the appropriate states of preparedness to leave the ground and to order his readiness squadrons off the ground at a moment's notice. It enabled a sector commander to carry out interceptions with incoming raids; since he could see on his table map the minute-to-minute position, course and height both of the incoming enemy formation and of his own outgoing intercepting fighters. He could thus, by R/T, issue orders to his formation leaders in the air, giving the compass course to steer and height at which to fly so as to ensure the best chance of interception.
When once visual contact in the air with the enemy raid had been made, the executive control of the fighters passed automatically from the sector commander in the operations room to the man on the spot, the leader of the fighters, who, in turn, issued to his pilots by radio telephony his executive orders for the conduct of the ensuing air battle. Interception depended finally on being able to see the enemy, so although the system worked well by day, it was not sufficiently accurate to effect interception at night against raiders not illuminated by search-lights.
When the battle was joined, it was the function of the sector commander or his representative in his operations room to `listen-in' and observe radio silence during the fighting, unless it appeared that other enemy fighters or bombers were approaching the area, when the formation leaders were duly informed. Immediately the battle was over, it became the function again of the sector commander to take control and assist his pilots to regain their home base or nearest airfield if necessary, particularly when, as often happened, squadrons became much split up during a dog-fight or when bad weather intervened and petrol was low.
Group, and, in a less degree, sector commanders had many factors to keep in mind: the necessity for holding some squadrons in reserve to meet further attacks that might develop at short notice; recalling squadrons at the right moment to land .or re-fuelling and re-arming; petrol endurance; probable expenditure of ammunition. All these had constantly to be weighed up and decisions made very rapidly.
The whole technique of operating fighters in defence of Great Britain and the facilities provided in Fighter Command operations rooms were the result of a steady process of development over many years. Arrangements are never static. Improvements in methods, in layout and in equipment of operations rooms, are constantly being introduced. However, the existing arrangements today are, in their essentials, the same as they were in the days of the Battle of Britain.
The A.O.C.-in-C. Fighter Command
The R.A.F. was fortunate in having Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh (now Lord) Dowding as Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command at that time. He had a wide experience specially fitting him for that particular post; originally in the Artillery, he had served as a comparatively junior officer of the Royal Flying Corps in France during the War of 1914-18, had been Director of Training from 1926 to 1929, commanded the Fighting Area in 1929-30, and was then on the Air Council as member for Research and Development till he took up the post of Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command in 1936. And he had other qualifications: he had been a soldier and an airman, but he was also a scientist at heart and this enabled him not only to keep personal contact with the scientific world, and through it with scientific developments, but to appreciate how those developments might assist in solving the problem of air defence. He may have displayed a dour exterior, especially to his equals in rank, but it covered, without wholly concealing, a very deep and true affection for those who worked with him and under his orders, above all for the fighter pilots themselves. His reserve of moral courage greatly strengthened his subordinates at critical periods.
His preparations for a possible battle of Britain had started before the War; for he had constantly endeavoured to ensure that Great Britain had an adequate fighter force with the necessary airfield facilities, intelligence and communications; he had provided for the training of that force, and then from the start of the war had struggled to prevent his force being dislocated by the need for fighter aircraft in France.
A.A. Guns
The anti-aircraft guns, under the Command of General Sir Frederick Pile, took no small toll of enemy aircraft, and during the heavy attacks on London rendered great service in turning them back, both by day and night, through the weight of their barrage. On some nights as many as 60 per cent. of the enemy aircraft approaching London from the South, dropped their bombs in open country or on the fringe of the barrage, and then went home. They also rendered direct service to our fighter aircraft, first by breaking up enemy formations, thus rendering them more vulnerable to fighter attacks, and secondly by indicating to our pilots in the air the position of enemy aircraft by shell bursts.
A.A. Balloons
The object of the balloon barrage was to protect vital points from low-flying and dive-bombing attacks, not so much by actual destruction of enemy aircraft as by forcing them to keep up above the balloon height, say 5,000 feet. This gave four advantages: first, it reduced the volume of air for which the fighter aircraft were responsible, since in areas so protected they could leave the lowest strata to the balloons; secondly, it forced enemy aircraft up to the height at which fire of the heavy anti-aircraft guns became effective; thirdly, it prevented accurate dive-bombing; fourthly, it prevented hedge-hopping tactics which were difficult to counter by even light A.A. weapons or by fighter aircraft. Enemy prisoners confirmed that the balloon barrage did stop dive bombing. Balloons flown from ships proved their value in the protection of convoys from dive-bombing attacks; this also helped Fighter Command by reducing the number of fighter aircraft required for convoy protection.
A balloon barrage itself would not afford protection unless supported by suitable A.A. weapons to prevent enemy aircraft shooting down balloons with impunity. Balloons were very vulnerable to weather risks, particularly gales and lightning, and were, of course, as much a danger to our own aircraft that had lost their bearings as they were to those of the enemy. As an instance of the vulnerability of balloons to bad weather, it may be noted that as many as 400 have been blown away in the space of 24 hours, though replacement normally took place in a remarkably short time.
Balloon Command was organized into groups, centres, squadrons, flights and sites. The operational unit was the barrage. This consisted of one or more squadrons and its size was determined by the number of balloons required to form cover to a possible target or series of targets. By July 1940 some 32 towns, ports and factories were protected by a balloon barrage; London was one of them.*
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* For further information regarding A.A. guns and lights and balloon barrages, see Roof over Britain, pre-pared by the Ministry of Information.
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Development of Radio Location
Before the end of 1934 the need had been recognized for some method of detecting aircraft at a greater range than was possible by means of sound location or by the Observer Corps. The possibility of making use of the principle on which radio location is based was discussed at the first meeting of a scientific committee sitting at the Air Ministry on 28 January 1935. Experiments were started and by July 1937 equipment was in production, and by the summer of 1940 the chain of stations was functioning with a high degree of success. The radio location system grew so fast and had to meet so many calls from overseas that training of the technical personnel and maintenance of the apparatus presented great difficulties. In spite of these handicaps, however, the system operated effectively and constituted a vital factor in the air defence of Great Britain.
Observer Corps
The good work of the Observer Corps was officially recognized by the grant in April 1941 of the title Royal.
The Observer Corps, which was under the command of Air Commodore Warrington-Morris, consisted of a Headquarters at Fighter Command, and areas, groups and posts. Each group consisted of a reporting centre and about 36 observer posts connected to it by telephone and covering an area of a medium-sized county. Each observer centre was connected by telephone to a fighter group operations room, to nearby sector operations rooms, and to adjacent observer centres.
The actual observing was done at the posts at which there were always two men on duty, and reliefs were provided so that every post was manned continuously throughout the twenty-four hours. By July 1940 the posts covered practically the whole of England, Wales, Eastern and Southern Scotland, and all aircraft friendly or enemy flying over the country were being reported in to the observer centres. A centre resembles a simplified operations room. Twelve plotters sit round the table, each connected by telephone to three posts. Their job is to plot aircraft tracks on the map as reported by posts and to give to the table supervisor other information received, such as types of aircraft, weather reports and other matters of operational value.
On the dais are the tellers, passing on plots as they appear on the centre table to fighter group and sector operations rooms and adjacent observer centres.
Where conditions permit, posts are spaced so that all aircraft flying over the country are within sight or sound of at least one post and continuous tracks are therefore obtained at the centres. Each track is given a separate symbol to maintain its identity, and when `seen' the height and number of aircraft are reported and `told' forward. The Observer Corps organization was the sole method of tracking enemy aircraft overland during the battle, and its efficiency enabled many successful interceptions to be made and this contributed in no small degree to the result. It was also essential for the air raid warning systems.
In addition to the work in connection with Air Defence the organization was of great value in enabling our own aircraft, lost in thick weather or at night, to be grounded. Any aircraft thought to be in difficulty owing to its erratic course, the sound of its engines or distress signals was specially tracked and told forward. In some cases R.A.F. airfields were asked by centres to light their landing lights and fire pyrotechnics to help the aircraft down.
The organization was a very democratic one, members being drawn from all classes of society, but all were animated by the knowledge that their work was of vital importance to the country and to the Royal Air Force. Their skill at recognition reached an astonishingly high standard. During the severest winter known for half a century, every post and every centre was continuously manned day and night by these civilian volunteers, many of them over sixty years of age. Their motto is Forewarned is Forearmed.
Air Sea Rescue
The Germans had as early as July 1940 organized a rescue service for their airmen forced down in the sea. The British system was not fully organized until after the formation of the Directorate of Air Sea Rescue in the middle of February 1941, but previous to that date much effort was devoted to effecting rescues from the sea with the wholehearted co-operation of the Navy.
Apart from their own S.O.S. signals, airmen might be located either by shore watchers such as coastguards or by convoys and other ships moving round our coasts; operational aircraft were also used to search for aeroplanes of their own unit known to have come down in the sea or suspected of having done so.
For the actual picking up naval craft and R.A.F. high-speed launches were used, as well as lifeboats of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. The surface craft, including the R.A.F. launches, were under the operational control of the local naval authorities for this particular duty. They formed a chain round the coast, an important centre being at Dover where a rescue service had been working from May 1940.
Towards the end of August 1940, a development took place on the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command. Twelve Lysander aircraft were borrowed from Army Co-operation squadrons with their crews and maintenance staff, and were located by pairs at six different stations. These were employed to search in a belt 20 miles wide from the Wash to the Bristol Channel and on to Milford Haven, thereby supplementing the work already being carried out by other methods. At that time no dinghies were available for single-seaters, the pilot depending solely on his Mae West waistcoat. So the Lysanders carried on their bomb racks dinghies which were dropped when any pilot was located floating in the water. These Lysanders, which carried W/T, were also responsible for directing surface craft to the rescue. Outside the 20-mile belt, groups of the Coastal Command were responsible for locating airmen forced down in the sea, but obtained the co-operation of the Bomber Command. Fluorescine powder, which coloured sea water a vivid green for several yards around an immersed pilot, was issued towards the end of August 1940.
Meteorological Service
The Meteorological Service was very complete during the Battle of Britain, but was of course handicapped by the fact that much of the information which it had been accustomed to receive in peacetime had been cut off. It was particularly valuable in forecasting weather for night operations during September and October. Forecasting at sector headquarters had just been instituted and the sector controller was thus able to keep in personal touch with a Meteorological Forecasting Officer who could keep him informed of changing conditions, height of cloud base, cloud thickness and visibility. This ensured that night defence aircraft would patrol throughout their maximum endurance and were able to land on the completion of their patrol. The forecaster was also able at all times to help his sector controller by giving corrections to the indicated altimeter heights. These corrections might amount to anything up to l,000 feet, and were of much value in enabling the sector controller to give accurate orders for the height at which to fly, in order to intercept the enemy. Warning of strong winds and thunderstorms also proved very valuable in preventing casualties to balloons.
