Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - ETO -  AP 156: Battle of Britain - 4. German Plans

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. Air Ministry Pamphlet 156; Issued by the Department of the Air Member for Training, August 1943

THE BATTLE

IV. German Plans

Not until after the war will any final analysis of the German air strategy during the Battle of Britain be possible: all that can be done at present is to piece together by inductive methods what appears to have been the German plan.* Did the Luftwaffe have a clearly worked out plan of attack, fitting into a more general invasion scheme, or was it content to shape its tactics according to the situation as it developed? One view, which is at least reconcilable with the known facts, is that the Luftwaffe had been assigned by the German High Command a definite role to play in the projected invasion and had probably been given a definite time schedule. Part of the German programme was obviously to eliminate the R.A.F. Fighter Command and to do this quickly, if possible. It is a matter of argument, however, whether that objective remained in the forefront of the German invasion scheme throughout the battle.

The initial failure to achieve air supremacy over South-East England ought logically to have decided the Germans against invasion in August and September of 1940. But the threat of invasion was, in fact, maintained until well on into October. There is also the point that it is difficult to find any motive for the savage and prolonged attacks on London if it be assumed that the Luftwaffe was, at that stage, still mainly concerned to destroy Fighter Command.

Now there is evidence to show that the Germans intended the assault on London to be a coup de grace. It looks, therefore, as if the Germans, having for the moment surrendered their early hopes of quickly overcoming our fighter defences, were hoping to produce the conditions of chaos in the capital which would have considerably increased the chances of immediate invasion. If only a temporary air supremacy over London and South-East England could have been achieved by day, or if the indiscriminate night attacks had sufficiently under-mined civilian morale in the capital, the chance of organized resistance on the ground in the South of England might very well have diminished to the point where the gambler at the head of German affairs might have risked all - despite the British Navy and despite the still unconquered Royal Air Force. The calculation proved incorrect, and so Goering was thrown back upon the only other alternative - that of trying to wear down our fighter defences by sending over continuous small formations of fighter-bombers. When that scheme failed the invasion timed for 1940 may be said to have been `off'. Only time can show whether this interpretation is correct, but it is put forward here as a possibility.

Main Phases of the Battle

Looked at in this way, the Battle of Britain falls fairly naturally into three main stages - the battle for the Channel and the South Coast (10 July-18 August), the battle of London (24 August-27 September), and the battle of attrition (28 September-31 October). Each of the first two stages may be divided into two. The period between 10 July and 7 August may be regarded as one in which the German Air Force was testing and trying to weaken the strength of our air defences. This was followed by ten days in which the Luftwaffe tried to overwhelm Fighter Command by sheer weight of numbers (8-18 August). After a few days of comparative lull from 19 to 23 August, the battle of London was initiated by an attempt to uncover the approaches to the capital by concentrated attacks on fighter airfields in Kent and also to achieve some measure of air supremacy over the Thames Estuary. The full-scale day and night offensive against London opened on 7 September and lasted roughly until 27 September.** After that date the Germans were forced to abandon their mass daylight attacks by long-range bombers owing to the heavy casualties inflicted upon them by our fighters. The final or fighter-bomber stage covered the rest of September and the whole of October, and was chiefly remarkable for a series of fighter-bomber attacks and fighter sweeps which raised new and acute problems for Fighter Command.

Causes of German Delay

Before the description of the actual progress of the air warfare from July to the end of October, it is necessary first to dispose of a preliminary question of some importance. This is why it was that no attempt was made to invade these islands in the latter half of June at a time when, by general consent, the chances of success were highest. Several reasons may be advanced - some of which were purely material, others political, and the rest psychological.

Collapse of France Unexpected

There was, first, the unexpected collapse of French resistance. This seems to have taken the Germans themselves by surprise, for although their entry into Paris took place on 14 June, on the day before the date actually forecast, no one could have predicted that the French would decide to negotiate for an armistice as early as 17 June. If, as is probable, the Germans had assumed that the Battle of France would last longer than it actually did, it is not unlikely that their plans for an immediate invasion of this country were not complete even at the beginning of July. The final evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force took place on 17 June. Two days earlier the bomber squadrons of the Advanced Air Striking Force had been withdrawn, leaving a few squadrons of fighters to protect Cherbourg and Nantes. By the evening of 19 June, these fighter squadrons and the bomber squadrons which had been operating against Italy from the South of France had also been recalled. By this time the Germans were advancing on Lyons. On 21 June, Hitler dictated his terms to the French plenipotentiaries in Foch's railway carriage at Compiegne. From that date, therefore, it would have been theoretically possible for the German attacks to have been directed on Great Britain.

Time required for Reorganization

For invasion schemes to have been put in hand immediately, however, it would have been necessary to organize new forward air bases from which the Luftwaffe could have operated against our southern shores and also to have assembled the necessary shipping and landing barges in the Channel ports. These were complicated moves which required time. The Germans did not become effective masters of the Atlantic seaboard of France till 27 June, when they reached the Spanish border, and it was not until the last day of June that they occupied the Channel Islands. The airfields in Northern France had not been left in such a state that they could be immediately utilized and the German squadrons had to bring up all their necessary ground crews and supplies. Even though this was done by air transport, it was well on in July before it was completed. After the intensive operations against the Low Countries and France and the engagements over Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe required a breathing spell to rest its crews and to re-equip. Even the long-range bomber units which had not been so fiercely engaged were not in a position to operate effectively by night against Great Britain from bases in Holland or Belgium because of lack of experience in night flying. As regards the collection of barges, it was not until 12 July that photographic reconnaissance established the presence of large concentrations in the Belgian canals and not till the first week in September were large numbers in position in the Channel ports.

Effect of British Offensive

Nor during this period did the R.A.F. remain as passive spectators of the preparations directed against us. On the very day when our bomber squadrons were evacuated from France, Blenheims attacked airfields at Rouen and Amiens at which enemy aircraft were believed to be concentrating for night raids on England. Extensive damage was done to runways, hangars and parked aircraft. On the following day, Hurricanes carried out a low-flying machine-gun attack on 40 Ju.52 on the airfield at Rouen, setting four on fire and damaging sixteen others. From this time on daily offensive patrols were flown by our fighter aircraft over France to attack enemy aircraft both in the air and on the ground. By night our bombers paid particular attention to the main railway centres in the Ruhr and the Low Countries in order to delay the forward moves on the North Coast of France as long as possible, and also attacked airfields in France, Belgium and Holland.***

Hitler's Peace Feelers

Finally, the Führer seems to have wished, by intensifying the war of nerves against Great Britain, to explore the possibilities of talking the country into submission. According to neutral observers in Berlin, Hitler had made up his mind that the British would refuse to continue the war against such overwhelming odds. Before the peace offer could be launched with any prospect of success, however, he would have to allow a certain amount of time to elapse in order that the full seriousness of the situation could be appreciated by the British people. After the necessary interval had gone by, during which he made a triumphal re-entry into Berlin, Hitler proferred `peace' in a speech made before the Reichstag on 19 July. In this final `appeal to reason and common sense' the Führer expressed his inability to see why the war should go on any further. By proposing surrender in these terms Hitler probably intended to guarantee his position in Germany in case his alleged expectations of a British acceptance were disappointed. Perhaps, however, his hopes that the government and people of this country would see reason exactly as he did were not high. If so, it is more probable, as Mr. W. L. Shirer has suggested, that this feeler was put out as a manoeuvre designed to rally the German people for the fight against Britain.**** If the offer was refused, Hitler calculated that all the remaining German hesitations about prosecuting the war vigorously would be swept aside. Lord Halifax did decline the proposal on behalf of the British Government on 22 July.

While it is not possible to claim that Hitler had thus wasted precious weeks in order to promote these peace manoeuvres, it seems fair to argue that the preparations for the invasion might otherwise have been pressed forward more rapidly. The actual date of the air offensive might have been advanced several weeks and Fighter Command might have been attacked before it had time to recover from the intensive campaigns in France and over Dunkirk.

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* For an American view of the air tactics of this battle, see Chapter III of Major Seversky's Victory through Air Power.
** Night attacks on the capital, however, occurred every night till 3 November.
*** Between 20 and 30 June aircraft of Bomber Command attacked the following airfields by day: Rouen (twice), Merville (twice), Abbeville, Waalhaven (thrice), Bussem, Eindhofen, Schipol (four times), Bremen and Hamstede. Aircraft of Coastal Command also collaborated in these attacks and night attacks were also regularly made. The marshalling yards at Hamm, Schwerte, Osnabrück and Dortmund were also attacked at this period.
**** Berlin Diary, p. 355.