Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - ETO -  AP 156: Battle of Britain - 5. The Battle for the English Channel And the Soutsh Coast

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. Air Ministry Pamphlet 156; Issued by the Department of the Air Member for Training, August 1943

THE BATTLE

V. The Battle for the English Channel and the South Coast
10 JULY-18 AUGUST

Testing the British Air Defences (10 July-7 August)

No very satisfactory date can be chosen for the actual beginning of the Battle of Britain. The strength of the attacks on this country was increased gradually as more German operational units were established on the forward airfields in Northern France and as the German fighter pilots gradually gained experience of air fighting over enemy bases. In this account the 10th July is selected in order to bring out the fact that the Germans did not suddenly mount mass air attacks on our shipping and southern shores without any kind of previous preparation.

Two problems confronted the German Air Force in its operations against Britain at this time - the first was that it had to try out the strength of our fighter defences, to arrive at some reasonable estimate of the numbers of fighters we could put up against attacks in particular areas, and also generally to test our fighter defences with the object of discovering its weaknesses. These estimates were indispensable from the tactical point of view because on them would, to some extent, depend the nature and composition of the formations which would be despatched against this country and the direction and timing of the attacks. The second problem was how to minimize, so far as possible, the disadvantages resulting from conducting operations over a hostile country when even a temporary engine failure would often result in the loss of an aircraft and when pilots baling out inevitably became prisoners of war.

These difficulties were partly responsible for the initial assault on this country taking the form of attacks on our shipping, particularly in the Channel and on coastal towns. Coastwise convoys in the Channel were, it is true, a particularly important objective in themselves as part of the machinery of shipping distribution; and perhaps the Germans were also calculating that the attacks on convoys would develop into a serious drain on Fighter Command's resources, since more aircraft would need to be diverted to the work of static defence over convoys. They were, however, a difficult target because of the protection afforded by balloons and by our fighters.* Other vital targets were the radio location stations along the South and South-East coasts, and the opportunity was taken to attack these to prepare the way for the opening of the more massive assaults later. The destruction of the coastal towns and ports such as Dover, Southampton, Portsmouth and Weymouth, would be a natural preliminary to landing operations.

It was, however, most likely that the immediate object of this first phase of operations was to bring our fighter squadrons to action in areas where the German losses of pilots and crews would not be so heavy as they would otherwise have been if immediate attacks had been ordered upon targets further inland. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Germans were quick to develop a highly organized system of air/sea rescue which was in operation during July. The importance which the Luftwaffe attached to the recovery of pilots and crews may be judged from the resources which it lavished upon these rescue operations. Bombers were provided with inflatable rubber dinghies, Fluorescine to enable immersed crews to attract attention was issued, and floating refuges with provisions and wireless sets were anchored off the French coast. `E' boats and rescue launches operated in the zones where the air combats were fiercest and white-painted float planes (He.59) marked with the Red Cross, carried out rescues even during actual air battles.**

Attacks on Shipping and Coastal Targets

Even before 10 July the attacks on our convoys and coastal towns had begun. On 4 July, 20 Ju.87 and Ju.88 bombed Portland.*** On the same day a convoy was attacked in the Channel - two merchant vessels being abandoned and five others being badly damaged. A second convoy which was also attacked by bombers with fighter escort escaped. On the 7th two formations of 30 and 18 enemy aircraft approached Dungeness from Boulogne - both were, however, intercepted by our fighters, and the second was driven off without any shipping losses being sustained. In this combat three Me.109 and one Me.110 were destroyed for the loss of three of our fighters. On the following day naval and military barracks at Devonport were attacked and damaged and two large enemy raids on Channel shipping were intercepted off Dungeness during the afternoon. Again the losses in aircraft on both sides were only slightly in our favour. On 9 July the shipping raids were intensified - three attacks being made on convoys off the Isle of Wight and a total of seven attacks on two convoys off the East Coast.

On 10 July the enemy scale of effort was suddenly increased. On that day two large enemy formations appeared over the Channel - the first, in the forenoon, consisting of 30 Me.109 and a Dornier and the second of 120 aircraft. The larger formation had assembled behind Calais and attempted to attack a convoy off Dover. This time the balance of combat casualties tipped sharply in our favour - twelve enemy aircraft being shot down, while our fighter losses were only two aircraft. One enemy aircraft was also destroyed by A.A. fire. During the following week further attacks were made on shipping and convoys, particularly off Portland and Dover, by mixed enemy formations which usually comprised about 50 aircraft, in which dive-bombers predominated. The opposition encountered was probably stronger than the enemy had expected, and it was noticeable that from 17 July onwards enemy formations began to abandon their tasks and to withdraw when our fighter squadrons were sent up. This reluctance to press home their attacks continued up to the end of July. Exception must, however, be made of operations in the Dover area where the enemy was able to provide considerable fighter protection for his dive bombers. Several large encounters took place off Dover, in particular on 25, 28 and 29 July, and although a good deal of damage was done to small merchant vessels and to some small naval units, the enemy losses in aircraft were heavy.**** The main successes gained by the Luftwaffe during the period down to 7 August were on 19 July, when six Defiants were destroyed in one major engagement for the loss of one Me.109, and on 27 July when a surprise attack on Dover Harbour was carried out by nine Me.109 equipped as fighter-bombers, which inflicted some damage and retreated across the Channel before they could be intercepted.*****

Tactical Results

So far as any conclusions could be drawn from these preliminary air engagements, in which both sides were taking the other's measure, they seemed to be that the German dive bombers would need adequate fighter protection if they were not to suffer crippling losses, that even over the sea approaches German air-crew and pilot wastage would prove much more pronounced than that of the defenders and that the ratio of German aircraft casualties to the number of aircraft despatched rose as the effort was increased. One matter that caused the Germans some anxiety was the need for greater defensive armament on their bombers, which had hitherto relied on evasion and fighter escort for protection.* ***** Against the British fighters these methods had proved inadequate. The results achieved so far as the damage to convoys and coastal towns was concerned was not wholly unsatisfactory. This, however, could hardly compensate the Germans for having proved to themselves that air supremacy over this country would not be easily won.

On the other hand, Fighter Command had its anxieties too - it was apparent that the pressure of the enemy air attacks would be steadily increased and the strain on our fighter squadrons, many of which had not yet recovered from the effects of the campaigns on the Continent, might be serious if intensive operations followed immediately. As day fighters, the Defiants had already revealed certain weaknesses which were later to cause their withdrawal from the day operations at a time when every machine was needed badly. At this early period too, the fighter defences of the South-West had not been fully organized and, in particular, Plymouth and the naval dockyard at Devonport were not adequately protected. It was apparent that the real test had not yet come.

Bombing Offensive

Whilst these operations were in progress the R.A.F. did not content itself with remaining on the defensive. During the first half of July Bomber Command aircraft attacked enemy ports and shipping. By night, canals and shipbuilding yards at Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, Cuxhaven, Bremen and Emden were bombed on several occasions, while industrial objectives in the Ruhr and hostile airfields were frequently visited. Aircraft of Coastal Command carried out numerous attacks on enemy M.T.Bs and barges in French ports and Belgian canals. Daylight operations by Blenheims were restricted by unsuitable cloud conditions. During the last half of July primary targets for our heavy bombers were enemy aircraft factories and depots, with oil targets as secondary objectives. The tasks assigned to our medium bombers, however, continued to be daylight attacks on barge concentrations and shipping. In the second half of July, therefore, the Focke-Wulf works at Bremen, the Fieseler works at Kassel, the Dornier factory at Wismar, airframe factories at Gotha and Wenzendorf as well as aircraft storage depots at Rotenburg, Göttingen and Eschwege were all heavily attacked by night. Daylight attacks by medium bombers were again hampered by unfavourable weather but one highly successful operation against the airfield at Cherbourg was carried out on 1 August by Coastal Command Blenheims escorted by Blenheim fighters. Considering the small numbers of aircraft which could then be employed, the moderate bomb loads carried and the number of targets attacked, the results of this defensive-offensive, which appeared to neutral observers disappointing, must be accounted from the British point of view as having been well worth the effort.

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* It should be explained that at the beginning of the Battle of Britain Fighter Command was responsible not only for the interception of enemy aircraft operating against land targets in this country, but also for the protection of coastwise convoys. Between 8 August and 31 October approximately 30 per cent. of the total day sorties made by Fighter Command were flown on duties other than interception - the majority being on shipping protection. This diversion of effort from Fighter Command's main responsibilities was, however, considerably lessened by Coastal Command, which during the course of the battle took over the work of protecting convoys off the West, North-Western and North-Eastern coasts, from Start Point to Flamborough Head - with the exception of the Firth of Forth.
** A protest against this improper use of German Red Cross aircraft was made by the British Government on 29 July. The use of the Red Cross symbol to cover the recovery of valuable air crews and pilots and the reconnaissance activities of the seaplanes were the main reasons why this practice could not be countenanced.
*** This was the first time that German short range dive bombers were identified in action against targets in this country.
**** On the 25th, when a British convoy of 21 small ships was attacked, 5 were sunk and 5 damaged. On the 29th, in the attack on Dover Harbour, one small ship was hit.
***** This is one of the first recorded attacks made by Me.109 equipped as fighter-bombers.
* ***** The reliance on evasion was one of the mistaken conclusions which the Germans had drawn from their operations in the Spanish civil war.
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The German Attempt to eliminate Fighter Command (8-18 August)

By the end of the first week in August the Luftwaffe had completed its preparations for the mounting of mass daylight attacks, and accordingly in the next phase, from the 8th onwards, it attempted nothing less than the complete elimination of Fighter Command. By that time German units had attained the requisite serviceability for undertaking a major offensive, the necessary stores and equipment had been brought up to forward airfields in Northern France, the indispensable reconnaissance work had been carried out, and preliminary estimates made of the strength of our fighter defences.

Moreover, since the fall of France the territorial limits of the various operational air commands of the Luftwaffe had been redrawn and specialized tasks had been assigned to the commanders who were to deliver the grand air assault on Great Britain. In supreme command of the Luftwaffe was Reichsmarschal Hermann Goering. It was not until early September that Goering took personal charge of the air operations, but there can be little doubt that it was he who laid down the main lines of the Axis air strategy. The actual direction of the air attack against this country in August of 1940 was entrusted to Generalfeldmarschal Kesselring, in charge of the second Air Fleet (Luftflotte 2) and Generalfeldmarschal Sperrle, who controlled the third Air Fleet (Luftflotte 3).* Both were men of exceptional energy and ability, and Sperrle had already shown what Great Britain could expect if the battle went against her by his destruction of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War. Kesselring was to organize the attacks on the East and South-East of England, while Sperrle was to concentrate on the South-West. Both Luftflotte Commanders controlled several Air Corps or Fliegerkorps.**

The German air forces in Norway were commanded by Generaloberst Stumpff in charge of Luftflotte 5. Under his orders was General der Flieger Geissler commanding Fliegerkorps X. Rather apart from these regular Air Force Commands was an Air Division (Fliegerdivision IX) based on Holland, which was to specialize in attacks on shipping and minelaying. It was commanded by Generalleutnant Coeler.***

German Advantages

On the eve of the battle there was perhaps some justification for the German belief that the Luftwaffe held most of the trumps and would be able to make short work of the destruction of Fighter Command. In this expectation the German High Command apparently relied on three advantages - the effect on their aircrews of past success, superior numbers, and a superior strategical situation. The predominant role played by the Luftwaffe in the conquest of the Continent, the general feeling that the air force personnel represented the corps d'elite of the German armed forces, and the realization that an invasion of Great Britain would largely depend upon their success in achieving air supremacy over this island, along with a strong dash of Nazi fanaticism, combined to imbue the German airmen with a belief in their invincibility, a belief that remained unshaken in spite of the losses inflicted on them by the R.A.F. in France and over Dunkirk. Like the rest of the German armed forces, the Luftwaffe had a blind faith in its Führer and a remarkably high sense of discipline.

Traditionally, also, the Germans had always relied on the `big battalions', and it is not surprising that, with a four to one superiority in first-line aircraft, the Luftwaffe was confident that the Royal Air Force could be overcome by sheer weight of numbers. In August 1940 the estimated first-line establishment of the German Air Force on the western front was approximately 3,450 aircraft, and the monthly rate of production was about l,600 of all types, of which 1,100 were operational types.**** The Luftwaffe was thus in a position to incur a high rate of air-craft casualties over a considerable period and past experience had shown that it was willing to do so in order to gain definite objectives. The prize that now awaited it was the most coveted of all and the cost appeared hardly worth counting.

Lastly, there was the pronounced strategical advantage represented by the secure possession of numerous and widely distributed air bases from which to strike against the most vital targets in Britain. The whole of the Western seaboard of Europe from the North Cape to Biarritz was in German hands, and it is worth while, for a moment, pausing to consider what this meant in terms of air power. On this question it is interesting to recall a broadcast appreciation of the air situation at the outset of the Battle of Britain made by General Quade, an acknowledged authority on air strategy and a former Commandant of the G.A.F. Staff College. Quade drew attention to three advantages of the new military situation which he expected to prove decisive. These were the shortened flying distances to British objectives, the fact that the approach would be over the sea, and the wide front from which attacks could be delivered. `Most important' he said `is the fact that there is not a single town or port in all the British Isles which cannot be reached by our aircraft, and in no case is the flying distance such as to demand from them maximum endurance.'***** From Norwegian bases Germany could dominate the entry to the Northern North Sea, the Shetlands and the ports of the East and West coasts of Britain. From airfields in Northern France and the Low Countries, industrial centres such as Liverpool or Birmingham could be reached in less than 90 minutes. The shortened flying distances also meant that types of aircraft which had previously been unable to operate against Great Britain could now be used, that bomb loads could be increased, and that the same aircraft could operate two or three times a day. The sea-approach to British objectives was an advantage because it rendered possible the making of surprise raids and also because it shortened the distance to be flown over hostile territory. `In most cases' Quade explained `the shortest possible distance from coast to objective is chosen in order to reduce the time during which the aircraft is subjected to the possibility of attack by ground defences.' Much more valuable was, however, the wide front covered by the German air bases opposite this country. This would enable attacks to be delivered from different directions either upon the same target or upon widely separated objectives at the same time. By this means a very great strain might be imposed upon the British fighter defences whose resources had to be severely economized. German air forces could be assembled quickly from different points and could be as quickly dispersed. Above all, this situation offered great scope for confusing the British fighters by the use of feint attacks.

Attempt to Overwhelm Fighter Command

These advantages were put to the fullest use during the fierce air engagements of 8 to 18 August - a period of ten days, which in some ways was the most crucial phase of the Battle of Britain. It soon became clear from the weight of the attacks delivered, from the tactics employed and from the objectives selected, that the Luftwaffe was staking everything upon the attempt to gain air superiority by a process of exhausting our fighter defences. The attacks on convoys and coastal towns were continued but on a scale not hitherto attempted, and to these were now added, as targets for special attention, radio location stations on the South and South-Eastern coasts, Fighter Command airfields, balloon barrages and aircraft factories. To exhaust our fighter squadrons attacks were made on a wide front along the coast from Dover to the Isle of Wight and beyond. Feint approaches were used to conceal the real point of attack and to confuse the defenders, while massed formations were sent over with the object of `crashing through' to vulnerable targets. From 11 to 14 August inclusive, the average estimated number of German aircraft operating daily against this country was over 400, while on the 15th and 18th approximately 30 per cent. of the German long-range bomber force based in France and 40 per cent. of its fighter strength was probably employed. A special feature of this phase also was the extensive use made of the dive-bombing Ju.87 for attacks on land targets, especially airfields. This experiment proved disastrous and was abandoned. Portsmouth, Portland and Southampton were frequently attacked and on one or two occasions enemy aircraft penetrated as far as London. From the point of view of the defenders these days represented a phase of intensive effort which was never again equalled for a similar period during the battle, and will always be remembered for the crippling losses inflicted on the enemy - losses which forced him to postpone the realization of his dream of air superiority and which imposed on him the necessity of devising new tactics. This defeat might almost be said to have been decisive, for when the Luftwaffe again put out its full strength after this initial rebuff our fighter resources were stronger, new squadrons had come into the line, and the fighter pilots who had borne the heat of the clay over Dunkirk had been given a short respite.

Attack on Channel Convoy

The Luftwaffe spent practically the whole of Thursday, 8 August, in attacking one of our Channel convoys. The attack was, in fact, the greatest ever made during the Battle of Britain upon a single convoy, and was one of the most notable of all the air battles fought at this time. The whole convoy amounted to twenty ships totalling 18,000 tons. It was attacked just before dawn on the 8th by E boats which had been assisted in their approach by parachute flares dropped from aircraft. Two small ships totalling 2,540 tons were torpedoed and sunk, but not before one E boat had been destroyed by gunfire and another badly damaged. The first air attack was made in the morning off the Isle of Wight, and two other small ships were sunk. The enemy, however, paid heavily in aircraft for the success, losing nine aircraft - our losses being two Hurricanes.* ***** At noon the attack on the convoy was resumed, and this time our fighters destroyed 27 enemy aircraft for the loss of five Hurricanes. A further attempt to sink the convoy was made in the evening off Bourne-mouth, when 15 enemy aircraft were destroyed; we lost one Hurricane. Both the second and the third attacks had been covered by feint attacks in the Dover area, and these had added to the tale of losses. As the result of these engagements the enemy lost 53 aircraft definitely destroyed as against our losses of 18 (one of which was a Blenheim on a training flight). During the day, No. 145 Squadron, which had been in action three times in defence of the convoy, shot down no less than 21 aircraft, of which 12 were dive bombers. Another Squadron which played a conspicuous part in this battle was No. 43, which then went into action for the first time and shot down 15 enemy aircraft, including 10 dive bombers for the loss of two Hurricanes. The convoy losses by air action were two ships sunk and seven damaged.

August 9 to 14

The next two days (9 and 10 August) were devoted by the Germans mainly to reconnaissance, and on the 10th the overland offensive activity was negligible. On Sunday, 11 August, the enemy effort was again increased. Several early morning attacks were made on the Dover Balloon Barrage - a number of the new Messerschmitt 110 Jaguar fighter-bombers being employed to give an air of greater seriousness to what was, in fact, a feint. The real attack came in a different direction while the engagements off Dover were continuing. The objective was the naval dockyard at Portland which was approached by a mixed force of about 200 aircraft. About 150 of them crossed the coast and subjected Portland to both high-level and dive-bombing attacks, which did considerable damage. Seven of our fighter squadrons intercepted and shot down 23 of the enemy aircraft for the loss of 16 fighters. With hardly any respite the Germans then despatched about a hundred aircraft in two waves to operate against a couple of convoys in the Thames Estuary and off Harwich. Several ships were hit. In all 38 enemy aircraft were shot down, five by anti-aircraft fire.

From 12 to 18 August the attacks on coastal towns continued, but the main effort was exerted not against convoys but against R.A.F. airfields with the intention of disorganizing our fighter defences and pinning our aircraft to the ground.

The pattern of enemy activity on the 12th and 13th was practically the same - the attack ranging in pendulum fashion backwards and forwards along the whole of the South coast from the Isle of Wight or Weymouth to the Thames Estuary. The early morning attack on the 12th was made on a wide front along the Channel coast chiefly against radio location stations. This was followed by dive-bombing attacks on two convoys in the Thames Estuary which cost the enemy six Ju.87 and six fighters. Just before midday a mass attack was made on Portsmouth by about 150 aircraft. On this occasion the enemy approached the target by flying up the Channel in a westerly direction from Spithead and then turned through the gap in the balloon barrage formed by the Portsmouth harbour mouth. At this point their aircraft delivered a dive-bombing attack flying well below the height of the barrage before releasing their bombs. The rest of the day was devoted to attacks on airfields - several hangars being damaged at Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne.

Mass attacks were the order of the day on the thirteenth - 250 aircraft operating in the early morning for over an hour against targets in the Portsmouth area, 150 aircraft attacking Southampton in the afternoon, and another force of about 150 simultaneously attacking airfields in Eastern Kent. Major damage was caused at Southampton, where large fires were started in the warehouses and docks, but in an engagement with our fighters the enemy lost 33 aircraft. We lost two Hurricanes. In Kent, Ramsgate was heavily bombed, and the operations rooms at both Detling and Eastchurch airfields were destroyed. On 14 August Dover and Folkestone were dive-bombed by Ju.87, and a large number of enemy aircraft operated over Kent, but the main target was again airfields - this time particularly in the South-West. Middle Wallop airfield was attacked four times during the evening and Manston was again damaged. Cardiff, Colerne, Kemble, Yeovilton and Andover airfields were also attacked.

The Great Attacks of 15 August

On Thursday, 15 August, the Luftwaffe made a series of most highly co-ordinated and intensive attacks against which Fighter Command put up 899 interception sorties - a record which remained unbeaten throughout the whole period of the Battle of Britain. The pressure was such, and the attacks were made on such widely separated fronts, that all four of our fighter groups were in action. The day was in fact outstanding in many respects. No less than five major actions were fought; the activity ranged over a front of 500 miles from Plymouth to the Tyne, it continued throughout the day, and it included in the North-East one particular victory which had a lasting result. Of no other single day in the Battle of Britain could the same be said. On 15 September our fighters destroyed 15 more enemy aircraft than on 15 August with a smaller enemy effort against them; 15 September was also a more dangerous date, having regard to the general invasion situation, but the action was much more restricted and did not put the organization of Fighter Command to such a severe test.

The first major action of the day commenced at 1100 hours when about 100 enemy aircraft, including Ju.87, attacked the fighter station at Hawkinge. Buildings and hangars were destroyed and R.A.F. wireless stations in this area were put out of action for a time owing to the electric mains having been cut by enemy bombs. A heavy attack was also made on Lympne airfield, where considerable damage was done to hangars and hutments.

Then followed an attack which was perhaps the most interesting of all fought on this day. It was an experiment in what the German Command probably thought would be complete tactical surprise. Having met such sustained opposition from our fighters in South-East England, the Germans apparently decided that this had only been possible as the result of our bringing down to the main battle area fighter squadrons from the North and North-East. It was, therefore, hoped that a heavy attack against the North-East of England would encounter little or no opposition. If such was the intention, and it is highly probable that it was, seeing that no further experiment of the kind was tried during the Battle of Britain, it was the Luftwaffe and not the R.A.F. which received an unpleasant surprise. Nevertheless, it was a bold tactical move, especially as the targets were well outside the range of the Me.109, and the bombers had to be escorted by twin-engined Me.110, which were by then beginning to be regarded with some disdain by our fighter pilots.

This attack consisted of two simultaneous thrusts - one directed on Sunderland and Tynemouth and the other on the R.A.F. station at Driffield. Just after one o'clock in the afternoon a strong force of enemy aircraft operating in three waves, crossed the coast at different points and made for the Tyneside area. Instead of finding the skies empty of our fighters they were welcomed in by five squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes. The description of the enemy formations which was received at Fighter Command H.Q. was the most detailed which had up to then been given, and is worth quoting. Two mixed formations of Ju.88 and He.111 were observed. The first formation consisted of `ten tight vics of three aircraft flying in fairly wide formation, line abreast, with two similar abreast formations astern of the first. This was escorted by two waves of Me.110, each composed of six loose vics of six aircraft, each flying 1000 feet above and slightly astern of the bombers.' The second formation consisted of about 40 bombers in `spearhead' formation-i.e. a large vic enclosing vics of diminishing size in line astern-forming a kind of diminishing chevron pattern. These bombers were escorted by three loose vics of Me.110, 500 yards astern and about 500 feet above the bombers. These aircraft were thought to have been despatched from Stavanger in Norway. They did no damage of any military importance. At about the same time 30 to 40 Ju.88 and Me.110, thought to be operating from Aalborg in Denmark, came in over Flamborough Head and then split into eight separate formations to attack the R.A.F. station at Driffield. These aircraft did at least reach and do considerable damage to their target, wrecking several buildings, including the officers' mess and an A.A. Battery H.Q., and setting fire to three hangars. They were, however, intercepted by two of our fighter squadrons. During these attacks on the North-East the enemy lost no fewer than 56 aircraft certainly destroyed, of which seven were shot down by A.A. fire, 27 other aircraft were probably destroyed and 18 damaged. Our losses were two fighters destroyed and two damaged. No other major operations during the Battle of Britain were carried out against this country by the G.A.F. based in Norway, and activity by Norway-based aircraft was restricted mainly to reconnaissance flights, occasional torpedo attacks on shipping off Scotland, small attacks on Scotland by night, flying training and towed glider exercises.

The next attack had to be met in the South-East. At about 1430 hours 200 enemy aircraft concentrated in the Calais-Boulogne area, and half an hour later simultaneously attacked the fighter airfield at Martlesham and four radio location stations. Extensive damage to hangars was done at Martlesham. but comparatively little elsewhere. Aircraft factories at Rochester were also dive-bombed. Eight squadrons of fighters intercepted and shot down 15 enemy aircraft.

Two attacks were made in the evening and occurred simultaneously - the first in the South-West and the second against Croydon. Between 200 and 300 aircraft operated against Portsmouth, Plymouth and Middle Wallop airfields, and the attack in the Croydon area was carried out by over 100 enemy aircraft. The attack on Croydon was noteworthy as being the first occasion when bombs were dropped in the London area, and also because all the aircraft which actually bombed the aerodrome were shot down.

Last Days of First Phase

Thus ended the great day which was one of success not only for our fighters, but also for the A.A. gunners, who shot down 22 aircraft. The surprising thing is that the enemy effort was only slightly less on the following day, three major attacks being made during which Tangmere, Brize Norton, Harwell and Manston airfields were heavily bombed. In the evening the air fighting ranged far and wide over Dover and the Thames Estuary and between Shoreham and Selsey Bill. A day of rest was, however, conceded to the defenders on the 17th.

The Luftwaffe's strenuous and determined efforts to knock out Fighter Command in a week came to an end on Sunday, 18 August, when the Ju.87 dive-bombers operated for the last time in any strength, and when London's A.A. guns went into action for the first time. The main objectives were again airfields and radio location stations, and three major attacks were made.

The first massed formations crossed the coast about midday in the Dover area and attacked airfields to the South and South-East of London - at Kenley, Croydon, Biggin Hill and West Malling. The second attack in the early afternoon was concentrated on airfields and radiolocation stations in the Portsmouth area, at two airfields, where extensive damage was done. The third and last major attack occurred in the late afternoon, when enemy aircraft approached via the Thames Estuary and bombed Croydon and Manston airfields. Several interesting features about the toll of casualties inflicted on the enemy on this day may be noted. Of the total of 154 enemy aircraft shot down, 30 were destroyed by A.A. fire '(the highest daily figure scored by the ground defences during the Battle of Britain). During the raids over Hampshire in the afternoon two of our fighter squadrons had remarkable success. Nine Hurricanes of No. 43 squadron destroyed nine enemy aircraft of which eight were dive-bombers. An hour later, 11 Spitfires of 152 squadron, after intercepting a massed enemy formation, shot down a corresponding number of aircraft-10 Ju.87 and one Me.109. In these two combats our total loss was one Hurricane.

Result of First Phase

What were the net results of the air-fighting which had taken place between 8 and 18 August? Clearly the German hope that the R.A.F. would be fought to a standstill had not been fulfilled. It was the Germans who were forced, for a short while, to scale down the intensity of their air effort, and it was on them that a change of tactics was imposed. So far as bombing policy was concerned, Goering was satisfied with the results of the attacks on our coastal towns and ports, or at least he considered them to have been sufficiently effective as to feel free to proceed to the next item on the programme - London. The attacks on fighter airfields, which had been severe, had not achieved the result of immobilizing our fighters, and would therefore have to be continued. Meanwhile, the losses of the Luftwaffe in aircraft, and, above all, in pilots and crews had been considerable - particularly in Ju.87 dive-bombers.** ***** The Germans could afford to lose many aircraft, but not quite at this rate - a halt would have to be called not so much because the morale of the pilots and aircrews had been affected, as to give them a short rest and to enable them to digest the lessons of the recent air combats and to readjust their tactics in view of the next phase of intensive effort. Accordingly, during the next five days - from 19 to 23 August - the Germans greatly relaxed their efforts and thus allowed our fighters a short respite.

Changes in German Tactics

Even during that short interim period a marked change in German tactics began to be noticed. While it is not possible to claim that their new methods of air fighting were defensive, they were certainly more cautious. The Germans, however, were obliged to forego the use of one of their pet air weapons - the single-engined Ju.87, which had had such remarkable success in Poland and France. This aircraft was not employed again, except on isolated occasions, until November, and it seems probable that it was withdrawn from service against this country because of the high casualties it had sustained during the period 8-18 August  - though it is possible that the decision was taken because of the need to conserve these aircraft for an attempt at invasion. In line with the abandonment of the Ju.87 was the use, in the next phase, of high-level pattern bombing in preference to the dive-bombing which had so far been employed. This method of attack could, however, not be carried out unless strict formation flying was maintained, and it could also easily be countered. Since, with this method, all the attacking aircraft released their bombs simultaneously on their leader's instructions, they had to arrive over their objective with their formation unbroken. In the fighting at the end of August and beginning of September it was noticed that the German bomber pilots showed an increasing tendency to turn away or alter course when attacked in order to avoid breaking formation, and this was probably one explanation. High level pattern bombing was also a vulnerable method of attack, since it was dependent for its success upon the leader of the formation. If the leader was disabled the attack very often petered out. The bombers also began to fly higher, and at the end of August, Do.215 and He.111 were intercepted at heights up to 20,000 feet. Another change that occurred between 18 and 30 August was that the size of the fighter escorts to bombers was reduced - the proportion employed during that period being one fighter to one bomber. This, however, was only a temporary change, as the number of escorts was increased again in early September. Escorting fighters were, however, instructed to fly closer to the bombers, and they were more inclined to fly in protective circles when attacked. This device, too, could be countered by resolute fighter action, since if our pilots attacked the circle against its rotation and got inside it they were able to deliver a series of head-on attacks to which the enemy with their fixed guns could not reply until the circle had been broken. Finally, the Germans were now obliged, because of the losses which had been sustained on return flights, to put up screens of fighters over the Channel to protect the retreat of the attacking aircraft, and this safety device was one which the Germans felt obliged to maintain during the rest of the Battle of Britain.

To sum up, it may be said that the German effort to achieve air superiority at this early stage had been defeated, that the attempt to isolate the battlefield of the South coast had also been a costly failure, and that the Luftwaffe had been forced to adopt changes in tactics which were to place obstacles in their way when the next phase of intensive fighting commenced.

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* It should perhaps be explained that the German Air Arm or Luftwaffe is organized on a territorial basis. Like the R.A.F., it is also independent, that is to say, it is administered and operationally controlled by its own and not by Army or Naval Commanders. It is subordinated in all matters ultimately to a central Air Ministry.
** See Appendix B and Diagram.
*** All the above-mentioned commanders, with the exception of Coeler, had been promoted by Hitler on 19 July for their work in the campaigns against Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France.
**** The total of 3,450 was made up as follows: long-range bombers 1,270, bomber reconnaissance 290, dive-bombers 480, single-engined fighters 720, twin-engined fighters 340, army co-operation 200, and coastal 150. At the beginning of August 1940, 1,330 aircraft were in France (West of the Seine), 1,370 in France (East of the Seine) and Belgium, 170 in Holland, 350 in Denmark and Norway and 230 in West and North-West Germany.
***** See diagram, Appendix B.
* ***** The combat report of the leader of No. 145 Hurricane Squadron deserves quotation: We climbed to 16,000 feet and, looking down, saw a large formation of Junkers 87 approaching from the south, with Messerschmitt 109 up behind to 20,000 feet. We approached unobserved out of the sun and went in to attack the rear Junkers 87 before the enemy fighters could interfere.
`I gave a five-seconds burst to one bomber and broke off to engage two Me.109. There was a dog-fight. The enemy fighters, who were painted silver, were half rolling and diving and zooming in climbing turns. I fired two five seconds bursts at one and saw it dive into the sea. Then I followed another up in a zoom and got him as he stalled.'
** ***** The enemy's losses were partly due to his aircraft being without armour, but also to the fact that the fighter escorts to bomber formations flew at heights from 5-10,000 feet above the bombers, i.e. too high to give them adequate protection.