Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - ETO -  AP 156: Battle of Britain - 8. Conclusion

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. Air Ministry Pamphlet 156; Issued by the Department of the Air Member for Training, August 1943

THE BATTLE

VIII. Conclusion

Opportunities Missed by the Germans

some attempt has already been made in the course of the narrative to show why the Luftwaffe failed to achieve its objects during the various stages of the air battle. The fundamental question, however, remains: Why did the German Air Force fail to break the resistance of Fighter Command ? Why did it fail to achieve the air superiority on which it had so confidently counted at the outset? There can be little doubt that the Luftwaffe forfeited its greatest chance of success by not making large scale attacks upon this country during June and July. Whatever the reasons which accounted for the delay, it is clear that this comparatively late start put the German Air Force at a disadvantage. The golden opportunity of coming to grips with Fighter Command before our squadrons had even begun to recover from the severe air fighting in France and over Dunkirk was let slip. After the `colossal military disaster' of Dunkirk when we had lost nearly a thousand guns and all the transport and armoured vehicles of the B.E.F., as well as 30,000 troops, the effective defence of this island depended on sea and air power alone. The strength of Fighter Command had, how-ever, been much reduced by the continental air fighting, and might have been unequal to the task of defeating massed daylight attacks, if the assault had followed immediately. Whether or not the Germans were in a position to mount such an offensive in June or early July is another matter.

Limitations Imposed by Rigid Time-table

One result must be noted. Assuming that the German High Command had timed the invasion to commence about the second week of September, the Luftwaffe was left with about five weeks to achieve the indispensable air superiority. In these circumstances it is likely that the German Air Force was compelled to work to a rigid time-schedule. This would explain why the Germans, in order to proceed to the next part of their programme, several times abandoned one form of attack just at the moment when it would have paid them to have continued it. Thus the attacks on our Channel convoys were discontinued, just when they were causing serious concern, in order that Fighter Command airfields should be made untenable. The attack on London, similarly, was begun exactly at the moment when the attacks on airfields had placed great difficulties in the way of the regular functioning of the fighter sector organization. And, finally, the enemy had taken to scatter-bombing just in time to allow the capital to recover from the damage inflicted on its railway communications.

Soundness of British Air Defence System

A second reason why the Germans failed was that for the first time in the war they were opposed by efficiently organized fighter defences, which could not be disturbed by German land forces. The British Fighter Command was no hastily improvised system of defence, but had been carefully built up and tested over a long period of years, and especially during Sir Hugh Dowding's tenure of the position of C.-in-C. during the three years before the outbreak of war. The co-ordination of detection and defence, the methods of operational control through fighter groups and sectors, the reliable system of communications and the complex details of the operations rooms, had all been prepared with one end in view - the defeat of just such air attacks as were actually made during the Battle of Britain. It was a system intricate but fundamentally simple in its workings, highly centralized, but leaving a good deal to the group and sector commanders on the spot, closely knit together but easily flexible. Its supreme merit was that in the stress of unprecedented air fighting it worked and, above all, continued working. Every move made by the enemy, every change of tactics, every cunning device to confuse or deceive the defenders was countered in time, and for this the credit must go not only to the mechanism of Fighter Command, but to the men who operated it.

Crippling Effect of German Aircraft Losses

Thirdly, one of the fundamental causes of the Luftwaffe's defeat was the crippling aircraft losses which it sustained in August and September. One of the great mistakes made by the enemy during the battle was to count too confidently upon his initial superiority in numbers. He never learnt, until it was too late, that his bomber types were highly vulnerable. This miscalculation had far-reaching results. The German bombers were slow, relatively unarmed, and carried only small bomb-loads, and yet they were exposed, in the initial stages of the battle, to the full fury of the British high-performance fighters. The famous Ju.87 dive-bombers, which had won such easy triumphs on the Continent, were no match for the Hurricanes and Spitfires, and were withdrawn so early in the battle that they had no part in the fiercest air fighting. The other bomber types - the He.111, Ju.88 and Do.215 - even when they had been equipped with armour and provided with large fighter escorts, also proved incapable of resisting the onslaught of our fighters. During the fighter versus fighter combats of October the enemy did manage to curtail his losses in aircraft, but by that time the Battle of Britain had been virtually won.

Immediate and Ultimate Results of the Battle

The immediate result of the Battle of Britain, so far as the air was concerned, was that the German Air Force during the winter of 1940-41 concentrated on the night offensive against our great industrial centres. Profiting by the experience acquired during the night attacks on London, the Germans not only attempted to maintain a high scale of bombing effort, using on an average 200 aircraft a night, but also adopted the technique of `Coventrating' our major industrial cities. This technique involved the concentration of the whole of the bombing effort by night upon single targets, in the hope that the ground defences would be overwhelmed and our centres of war production wiped out one by one. The first of these concentrated night attacks was made on the night of 14-15 November on Coventry, and was followed by other major efforts against Birmingham on 19-20 November, Bristol on 24-25 November, Sheffield on 12-13 December, and Manchester on 22-23 December. Even these methods failed in their objectives, and the Luftwaffe was led once more to change its strategy, this time in the attempt to destroy our sea-borne traffic. One result of the Battle of Britain was, therefore, the so-called Battle of the Atlantic.

The ultimate significance of the Battle of Britain is more difficult to analyse. Its influence upon the whole course of the war was, however, profound in at least four respects. First, it prevented invasion of Great Britain. Second, the destruction of German aircraft prevented the first-line strength of the German Air Force, including immediate reserve aircraft, from expanding during the winter of 1940-41. This was a fact of great importance when it is considered that the British and Allied Air Forces were also able to develop until in due course air parity and finally superiority was achieved. Thirdly, by destroying the myth of German invincibility, the Battle of Britain made possible the rise of an effective system of collective resistance against the Axis and paved the way for the Grand Alliance of free peoples upon which our main hopes of victory are founded. Lastly, the events of the summer and autumn of 1940 destroyed the legend of the Blitzkrieg and changed the war into a war of attrition in which superior manpower and superior resources will ultimately prove decisive.