Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - ETO -  AP 156: Battle of Britain - 9. Retrospect

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. Air Ministry Pamphlet 156; Issued by the Department of the Air Member for Training, August 1943

THE BATTLE

IX. Retrospect

No Easy Victory

It must never be forgotten that the Battle of Britain was no easy victory. Our pilots were stretched almost to the limit of human endurance. The majority of the squadrons had had no rest for many weeks before it began. In France and over Dunkirk all but three of the day fighter squadrons in the Command had been engaged. After Dunkirk the pressure on the fighters had been less intensive, but hard fighting continued all along the coast from Calais to Le Havre, then on to Cherbourg, and the Battle of Britain followed with but little opportunity for the units to rest and re-form. During the later stages of the Battle particularly the effective fighter strength of the Command was running down. If the single-seater day fighter squadrons alone are taken into account, the effective strength at the end of October was almost exactly 33 per cent. less than the effective strength in the middle of July.

The Time Factor in Expansion and Development

The decision to expand the R.A.F., before the war had started, to a size capable of meeting its responsibilities in war, had in fact been taken dangerously late; for the size of an air force cannot be suddenly multiplied merely by a stroke of the pen. Training schools have to be organized, airfields selected and made, an adequate maintenance system built up and factories constructed or converted for the production of aircraft and their equipment. All this is a matter of years not months. Similarly, limitations of finance during peace restrict the capacity for testing experimental aircraft, engines and equipment, and thus long intervals elapse between the first specification of a new design and its appearance in service. The decision to have eight guns in single-seater fighters was made as early as 9 August 1934. Contracts for experimental prototypes of the Spitfire and Hurricane was placed in December 1934 and February 1935 respectively; this was barely in time for squadrons to be equipped with these aircraft in the Battle of Britain, although the designing firms had done much previous preliminary work. As already noted, the first inception of radio location was at the end of 1934.

The Material Factors

If the material factors only are taken into account the advantages would appear to have lain on the side of the Germans. For they had greatly superior numbers, whilst in other outward respects, the opposing forces were more or less balanced.

Although our fighters could deal easily with the German bombers, the qualities of the fighter aircraft on either side were not uneven. Our Hurricanes and Spitfires were very robust and reliable, were more manoeuvrable and had superior armament, but in speed and rate of climb they were on the whole inferior to the later types of German Messerschmitts.

Early warning by radio location enabled our small number of fighter squadrons to be operated to the maximum effect combined with economy of force; but against this must be set the fact that the Germans could choose their own time and direction of attack, and so were in a better position to effect surprise and to take the advantage of weather and sun.

The skill of our group commanders and formation leaders in devising means for dealing with enemy tactics was beyond all praise, but the Germans by no means adhered to one rigid plan, and showed originality and initiative in changing their methods.

However we had a clear advantage in that our system of training was undoubtedly better and more thorough than that of the enemy, and resulted in our pilots having those two essentials for air fighting, complete mastery of the aircraft and ability to shoot straight.

The Spiritual Background

The Germans started the Battle of Britain with an intense pride in their air service and complete belief that it would continue to achieve its former successes, but the morale of the R.A.F. rested on deeper foundations. The feeling of direct personal responsibility for the safety of the country and its people, the contemptuous hatred of Nazi methods graven on the hearts of those who had, in France, seen German aircraft mowing down defenceless refugees, the determination to seek out and destroy the enemy, a splendid carelessness of their own lives, combined with confidence in their own training, their aircraft and engines - these were the qualities which, though seldom if ever expressed in words, enabled those few to whom so many still owe so much, to face odds of 4, 8, even 12 to 1 not merely without hesitation, but as the natural thing to do.

Another aspect of their spirit was the team work throughout the whole of the R.A.F. Co-operation between individual pilots and between squadrons was a very big factor in the success of the air fighting. It was team spirit on the ground that ensured rapid servicing and the high standard of aircraft maintenance; it was team work of the training and maintenance units behind the squadrons that ensured replacements and reinforcements. There was complete understanding between the controllers at group and section headquarters and between the latter and their squadrons, while fighter groups less actively engaged loyally sent away their best pilots to reinforce groups bearing the brunt of the fighting.

Other commands co-operated wholeheartedly and gave every assistance in their power, not as a result of any formal request through official channels, but usually in response to a brief message on the telephone.

Value of the Offensive

The Battle of Britain was fought to protect this island, but it would be a mistake to concentrate on its defensive side. The Civil Defence Services did gallant and indispensable work, but battles are decided by hard fighting, not with stirrup pumps and sand shovels. And wars are won by attacking, and therein lies the main contribution made by Bomber Command. It was actuated by the same offensive spirit displayed by our fighter pilots, but in a wider sphere. It delivered many attacks, heavy for those days, on defensive targets such as enemy airfields. But the aircraft of both Bomber and Coastal Commands never ceased to carry out purely offensive operations. During the period of the Battle 45 per cent. of our total bombing effort was directed against such targets as oil installations, naval shipyards and communications in Germany itself.

The defensive bombing was by no means ineffective in reducing the intensity of the German attacks, but the fact that, even when apparently strained to the utmost to defend herself, Great Britain could still carry out a resolute offensive policy, must have done much to make Hitler doubt his ability ever to break us on this island, in which case, as the Prime Minister had said on 18 June, he knew he would lose the war. It was in the same speech that Mr Churchill called upon us all so to bear ourselves that should the Empire last a thousand years men would still say `This was their finest hour'. In 1942, on the anniversary of Trafalgar, Field Marshal Smuts was able to confirm that the Prime Minister's call had been answered. Addressing a joint assembly of both Houses of Parliament at Westminster, he said:

I have come back to a country over which the fury of war has swept. . . . Many of its ancient monuments are damaged or gone for ever . . . but one thing is not lost - the soul remains. Glory has not departed from this land. I speak not of outward glory - I speak rather of that inward glory, that splendour of the spirit, which has shone over this land from the soul of its people. . . . This is its glory - to have stood in the breach and to have kept the way open to man's vast future.