Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - ETO -  AP 156: Battle of Britain - Introduction

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. Air Ministry Pamphlet 156; Issued by the Department of the Air Member for Training, August 1943

Introduction

What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.

MR WINSTON CHURCHILL in the House of Commons, 18 June 1940

The battle to which the Prime Minister called the country on the day after Marshal Pétain had sued for peace did not follow immediately, as had been expected; nor did it take the form, which seemed almost inevitable after the evacuation of Dunkirk, of an actual German invasion. It was, in fact, to be not so much a battle of Britain as a battle for Britain. At the time, however, the prospect of fighting on the beaches and in the streets seemed a stark enough reality to the British people, who then found themselves alone confronting a ruthless and hitherto invincible opponent.

Seven weeks went by before the enemy made his massed air attacks in daylight upon this country, and in the strained and unnatural atmosphere of an island, hourly expecting a sea-borne invasion, which somehow failed to materialize, it was perhaps not surprising that few people even then appreciated that the battle had really begun. The air engagements fought over and around the coasts of Great Britain in the months of August, September and October of 1940 were in themselves an entirely new phenomenon, the significance of which could hardly have been immediately apparent. They are now conveniently but perhaps not very appropriately labelled the `Battle of Britain' as though that battle consisted of nothing else. Already there is a danger of false emphasis creeping in. Before the air fighting is described, it is necessary to place it in its proper setting. The heroism of our fighter pilots, the skill of their formation leaders, the organizing genius of the Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command, and the resource of the Group Commanders, are things which will long be remembered. There were, however, other participants in the battle, other Air Force Commands whose achievements should not be allowed to go unrecorded. The battle was not fought exclusively in the air.* It was fought on the airfields and in Headquarters - not only by servicing echelons and ground crews, but also by flying controllers, by intelligence and administrative staff, by equipment and signals personnel and by Station-Defence Officers. The part played by Bomber Command may be described broadly as the destruction of enemy embarkation ports and the prevention of the assembly of transports and assault craft; that of Coastal Command as reconnaissance towards the three-quarter circle of coast line held by the enemy and the protection of incoming convoys.**

Even the enemy's failure to achieve air supremacy over this island, which caused him to postpone and eventually to give up the invasion, might not have been decisive if he could have achieved his ends by other means, say by an effective total blockade by means of submarines and magnetic mines or by causing a collapse of morale in the capital as a result of heavy and continuous night attack. Both these methods were tried and defeated. The work of Coastal Command in the protection of our sea-going convoys and the staunch resistance of London and the great provincial towns to the `Blitz', form an essential part of the picture, and should not be overshadowed by the more spectacular aspects of the struggle.

In one sense, the greatest victory won during the Battle of Britain was in the sphere of the spirit. Hitler was frustrated not merely because for the first time he came up against a scientifically planned system of air warfare, but also because he had to deal with a people whose national fibre was tough whose unity was unwavering and whose Fifth Column was practically non-existent. In this `their finest hour' the British people were fortunate indeed in having as their guide and champion Mr Winston Churchill, whose speeches alone in the summer and autumn of 1940 did more than any other single factor to weld the national determination to resist and to strike back.

It will be seen from the above that the term Battle of Britain has been used in a rather more general sense than is now usual. In this pamphlet an attempt will be made to outline the progress and assess the results of the battle interpreted as an effort on the part of the German High Command actually to invade these islands. In 1940 the battle was viewed and even today to some extent is still thought of as a series of prolonged air victories in which the losses of the R.A.F. Fighter Command were remarkably small as compared with those of the Luftwaffe. This, however, is to miss the point that, in essence, the main result of the air fighting was to deny to the enemy the use of the English Channel and thus to prevent the transportation of a large armed force from the continent and the establishment in this country of a bridgehead, which would have subsequently been developed until Britain had been conquered. One of the curious reactions which followed the defeat of the Luftwaffe was the tendency to doubt whether the events of 1940 were anything more than a mere invasion scare. The evidence against such a view seems conclusive, and will be examined later. In this respect perhaps less than justice has been done to the R.A.F. and the need for a readjustment of ideas would seem to be needed.

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* This point was emphasized by the Secretary of State for Air on 18 September 1940:

But the battle is being fought not only in the air. It is being fought everywhere - it is being fought in the Maintenance Command, in the workshops, and at the dispersal points of the squadrons of the R.A.F. It is being fought in the Flying Training and Technical Training Commands of the R.A.F., whose hard work and devotion to duty, often under the enemy's fire, is greatly increasing the flow of air crews to our fighting squadrons. It is being fought, too, in the aircraft and air-engine factories and in our other munition factories.

* * Photographic reconnaissance throughout the Battle of Britain was carried out by a unit operating under Coastal Command. This Command also controlled the Swordfish and Albacore aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, which supported Bomber and Coastal squadrons in the attacks on the enemy's invasion barges.