Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - The Mediterranean - HMSO: The Air Battle of Malta - 10. The Fighters go out to Attack
THE AIR BATTLE OF MALTA. The Official Account of the R.A.F. in Malta, June 1940 to November 1942; PREPARED FOR THE AIR MINISTRY BY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION; London : His Majesty's Stationery Office 1944
X. The Fighters go out to Attack
JULY 1942
The month of July saw decisive developments in the air due to Malta's ever increasing strength. Because the fighters had not been strong enough, they had had to allow the attackers to reach the island in the majority of cases before attacking. Circumstances had always forced a defensive plan upon them. As the situation eased month by month, Spitfires had been freer to go forward to make their attacks, endeavouring to smash each raid before it crossed the coast.
THE FIGHTER PILOTS OF MALTA. Airmen such as these, from Britain and the Dominions, held the Axis assault for nearly two years, in a long defensive action. Now they carry the battle to the enemy.
On 1st July the Germans, evidently feeling again that Malta was becoming too much of a nuisance, opened a new attempt to bomb it into submission. They tried first to knock out the fighter force. But in contrast to the last time they had undertaken a blitz, there now awaited them fully equipped Spitfire squadrons. The enemy raids, although nearly continuous for a time, were on a smaller scale than the spring attacks, and their losses were far greater. In the first ten days of July over one hundred enemy aircraft were shot down. Malta lost less than a fourth of that number in pilots. It is known that one Ju. 88 bomber Squadron had to be stood down. By the middle of July losses were so heavy that dive-bombing was stopped. About the same time, it was possible to develop offensive plans still further. A plan for forward interception was tabulated. It was aggressive, and it worked well. It was the harvest of many months of toil against unequal odds.
On 14th July Air Vice-Marshal Lloyd relinquished his command. He had directed the air forces during unparalleled assaults, and he had never ceased to wage war by bomb and torpedo. The people of Malta honoured his name. As he was preparing to leave Valetta, an unknown civilian presented to him a cigarette case bearing the letters M.T.A.P. He discovered that the inscription stood for " Malta thanks air protection ".
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Keith Park, his successor, had had experience of fighting the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain when he commanded one of the most active fighter groups. He initiated the plan of forward interception. These are extracts from his Special Order of the Day :
" The magnificent fighting by our fighter pilots at Malta in April and May has very rightly been generously acknowledged. The courage, endurance and fine work of the Officers, N.C.O.s and men on the ground has not, however, received full acknowledgment. During the blitz in the spring, the enemy was so vastly superior in strength that our day fighters were practically forced on to the defensive. Under these conditions it was inevitable that Royal Air Force personnel on the ground, and civilians, should undergo severe bombing daily, and I now pay tribute to the courageous manner in which they kept our airfields going in spite of the lack of protection from our fighters.
" Our day fighter strength has during June and July been greatly increased, and the enemy's superiority in numbers has long since dwindled. The time has now arrived for our Spitfire squadrons to put an end to the bombing of our airfields by daylight. We have the best fighter aircraft in the world, and our Spitfire pilots will again show their comrades on the ground that they are the best fighter pilots in the world."
The interception of an increasing proportion of bombing raids before they crossed the coast was saving lives, aircraft, time, labour. The enemy gave it up : and in place of daylight bombing they started fighter sweeps in several formations stepped up from twenty to thirty thousand feet. In this phase of fighter versus fighter the Air Officer Commanding still ordered aggressive tactics :
" All fighter formation leaders are warned that the enemy will probably reintroduce bomber formations whenever there is an important operation in the Malta area. Because our Spitfires, using the forward plan of interception, have recently stopped daylight raids does not mean that only fighter sweeps are likely to be encountered over or near Malta in the future. Any signs of defensive tactics by our fighters will encourage the enemy to reintroduce formations of bombers or fighter-bombers. Therefore the more aggressively our fighters are employed, the better will Malta be defended against daylight bombing."
The gradual development of more aggressive tactics made increasing demands upon the ground organisation. Take-off of squadrons was accelerated : the squadron at stand by to be off within two minutes, the squadron at immediate readiness to be off within three minutes, the squadron at readiness to be off within five minutes. All the while conditions were improving. The grim fighting of the spring contributed to that improvement. Reinforcements helped. Radiolocation conditions, which had often reduced the chances of off-shore interception during previous months, were now being improved after exhaustive work by experts brought from Britain. Consequently the Fighter Operations Room, so long the key to Malta's successful air battles, was able to attain greater degrees of accuracy than had before been possible.
" The Fighter Sector Controller cannot win an air combat in a hundred years, but he can lose one in a hundred seconds." This well-known Royal Air Force motto made its appearance in Orders. The Controller has the difficult task of anticipating the enemy's movements and deciding his plan in accordance with prevailing cloud conditions and the sun's position. He must work out the problems of time and distance at very high speed. Malta's fighter operations room, hewn out of rock, differs from the usual organisation in the United Kingdom in that it combines the functions of a fighter Group and a fighter Sector. The Controller must therefore combine a strategical sense (the Group function) with a tactical sense (the Sector function).
One of the Squadron Commanders said of Group Captain Woodhall, who was in charge of the control room through many vital months : " The boys had a fanatical, yes, fanatical faith in his controlling. It was a faith which gave them a completely unreasonable confidence when, one day in April, he had controlled three Spitfires and four Hurricanes against a Hun plot of 130 plus. And, remember, he it was who organised and conducted the fighter defence of the island before as well as after the ` Spits ' arrived ".
INTO BATTLE. Hurricanes climb to the attack as the approach of Italian raiders is signalled. The airfield is Takali.
The carrying of the air battle forward over the sea cast new responsibilities upon Malta's Air-Sea Rescue Service. From June 1940 till the end of 1942, one hundred and twenty-three Royal Air Force pilots, thirty-four Germans, and twenty-one Italians had been rescued from the sea. The Service has always run in a specialised manner because its geographical situation is unique. It has always developed according to the air tactics of the moment, though the fundamental reasons for its success have remained the same. These are the quick diversion of operational aircraft to look for survivors in the sea, and serviceable high-speed launches ready at all times for a quick getaway. The work is often hazardous and there have been casualties among the crews.
These extracts from the log of Flight Lieutenant G. R. Crockett, indicate the type of operation they were called upon to perform :
" We left Kalafrana in H.S.L. 128 at 1725 on 14th April for two crashed Beauforts between Filfla Island and the mainland. Five minutes after leaving base we sighted Me. 109s circling high over Filfla but I decided to keep on. Though we had been shot at several times before and one other launch had been badly marked, I reckoned that with our own fighter protection and the launch's manoeuvrability there was a very sporting chance of getting away with it.
" When we were about half-way out to Filfla, our fighter protection, which consisted of three Hurricanes, contacted us, and we proceeded with them circling close overhead to the scene of the crashes. Me. 109s seemed to be approaching from all directions, and they started diving straight down for us, but with the Hurricanes turning inside them and deflecting their aim, their fire never came within fifty yards of us. We stopped and investigated a half-inflated dinghy, but there was no one near it, so we steamed over half a mile to the southward where we could see more wreckage and saw one man in a Mae West. On pulling him aboard we found he was dead.
" Things were getting even hotter by this time, as one of the Hurricanes had had to leave as it had run out of ammunition. I reported ` no survivors ' by wireless and requested instructions. We were told to return to base, so I set course for the nearest land, intending to crawl along under the cliff. We got close into the land in safety and the Hurricanes cleared off. Unfortunately the land opposite Filfla slopes gradually to the sea and doesn't offer much protection. As we rounded out of the points an Me. got us practically in his sights and let us have a long burst from right ahead.
" The man at the wheel was one of the five wounded by this burst ; he collapsed with a bullet through his thigh. As the wheel was to port at this time, the launch took a run for the shore, but jumping down from my look-out position I dragged the coxswain from the wheel and got the launch under control again.
" Creeping along within a few yards of the shore until we came to the Blue Grotto, we avoided any more attacks and, as none of the casualties were too serious and the Me.s were still stooging around, I decided to stay in the Blue Grotto until dusk. There was a fairly strong wind from the south-east, but after a bit of manoeuvring I managed to anchor so that we were protected on three sides by steep cliffs. The launch had been hit by six explosive cannon shells and about twenty bullets, but with some quick patching we had her seaworthy - and we were out on another search within an hour of reaching base."
Here is another story from a High Speed Launch log :
" At 11 a.m. on 18th May 1942, we had a call out in H.S.L. 128 for a Spitfire pilot said to have baled out on a bearing of 160 Hal Far about one hundred yards out. Sounded like a piece of cake, for even though enemy fighters were plentiful in the vicinity the position given was close to the island and we now had Spitfires on the job as well as Hurricanes. Getting on the given bearing we steamed 100, 200, 300 yards- still nothing seen - and kept on going, though enemy activity was getting more and more lively overhead.
" After we had steamed out about three miles one of the escorting Hurricanes was shot down a couple of miles ahead of us. It was while we were investigating this wreckage that Jerry got closest to us, but even then the bullets only churned up the water over a hundred feet away. As there was no survivor from this crash and still no sign of the original pilot for whom we had been called out, I decided to make for base, but on our way back we saw another fighter crash about six miles over to the westward and a parachute drifting down. We picked this pilot up within a few minutes of him hitting the water, and he turned out to be a Hun - a cheery soul, who advised us to get back ashore before we were hurt.
" As we were then fairly well out I decided to run out and then come in on our original bearing from a distance of about ten miles, as even the worst possible estimate of distance could hardly be over ten miles. We actually found the Spitfire pilot in his dinghy about nine miles from the land, and the German pilot insisted upon shaking hands with him as he welcomed him aboard."
The last weeks of July justified the plan of forward interception and, with greater fighter strength, placed the weapon of air confidence in the hands of the besieged. An offensive from Malta, limited only by fuel considerations, was steadily being waged by torpedo and bomb.
NO RETURN. This is the smoking wreckage of a Messerschmitt 109. During July enemy losses were very heavy, and a high proportion of the attackers never got back from Malta.
On 28th July an adventure befell the crew of a Beaufort engaged far afield in this offensive - off Sapienza, in southern Greece.
The captain of the aircraft was Lieutenant E. T. Strever of Klerksdorp, South Africa ; the rest of the crew were Pilot Officer (now Flying Officer) W. M. Dunsmore of Maghull, near Liverpool, Sergeant J. A. Wilkinson of Auckland, and Sergeant A. R. Brown of Timaru, both from New Zealand.
After releasing his torpedo at a merchant vessel, and being badly shot up by flak, Strever realised that his aircraft was doomed. As it hit the sea, he went under, but somehow managed to clamber clear of the wreckage and join the crew in their dinghy. Ninety seconds later the aircraft sank. After paddling for some time towards the coast, they saw an Italian floatplane, which presently landed about a hundred yards away. Strever swam over to it and he was courteously received with brandy and a cigarette ; he then explained in panto-mime what had happened. The rest of the crew was picked up, and the Cant floatplane taxied to a nearby island. Here, after a hearty meal, they were given the run of the officers' mess for the rest of the day. In the evening they had another excellent meal with the Italian officers, who considerately gave up their rooms to the crew when bedtime arrived. The only sense of imprisonment was that guards were posted in the passage and outside their windows. In the morning, after a breakfast of eggs and coffee specially provided for them, and having been photographed with their captors, the crew were taken aboard the Cant again, which then set off for Taranto.
The Cant's crew consisted of a pilot, second pilot, engineer, wireless-operator-observer and a corporal acting as an armed escort. Wilkinson was the first to see an opportunity of capturing the aircraft. Attracting the observer's attention, he hit him on the jaw and seized the escort's revolver. Passing this to Strever, he then used the corporal's body as a shield in approaching the first pilot. Strever followed, brandishing the escort's pistol, and held up the pilot before he could get at his own weapon. The Italian had put the aircraft's nose down as though to land, but at a menacing sign from Strever he changed his mind and pulled the stick back again. Meanwhile, Dunsmore and Brown dealt with the rest of the crew and Strever took over the controls.
The capture of the aircraft took only a few seconds, but Strever was now faced with the difficulty of having no maps or charts, and of not knowing the speed or capacity of the aircraft, nor how much petrol would be needed to reach Malta. He therefore set the second pilot free and put him at the controls. After making rough and ready calculations of his own, Strever decided that if they could not reach Malta they would come down in Sicily and trust to luck. The Italian steered the course set for him and Strever himself took the controls from time to time. At length they hit the toe of Italy, which enabled him to get some sort of fix, and he decided to chance the petrol situation and head for Malta. As they approached the island there began the most terrifying episode of the trip While flying at deck level, three Spitfires attacked them. Brown spun the guns about to show the fighters that he was not going to fire, and Dunsmore took off his white vest and trailed it out of the cockpit as a sign of surrender. But still the Spitfires spat, and when one of the wings was hit by machine-guns and cannon, Strever ordered the Italian to come down on the water. As they did so the engine stopped. They had run out of petrol.
Subsequently they were towed into Malta, where Strever personally supervised the Italians' comfort, which he felt was the least he could do in return for their hospitality. They all cheerfully agreed with him that there was nothing personal in the affair, and this fraternal spirit was emphasised by one of the Italians who produced from his suitcase a bottle of wine that he had intended to take with him on leave.
