Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - The Mediterranean - HMSO: The Air Battle of Malta - 11. Some Relief for the Garrison: The August Convoy
THE AIR BATTLE OF MALTA. The Official Account of the R.A.F. in Malta, June 1940 to November 1942; PREPARED FOR THE AIR MINISTRY BY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION; London : His Majesty's Stationery Office 1944
XI. Some Relief for the Garrison: The August Convoy
AUGUST 1942
Though the tide of air battle was turned by the defenders in May, June, and July, the siege was still tightening. The island had to swing suddenly to stringent rationing, and to ensure its strict enforcement.
On 6th May bread, the staple diet of so many of the Maltese, had been rationed for the first time. As each commodity came into short supply, so the rationing extended. Though the one thought in everybody's mind was to resume the offensive at the earliest possible moment, Malta must have supplies not only for that purpose but, indeed, in order to hold out at all for more than a limited period.
To get in supply ships and to prepare for the return of the 10th Submarine Flotilla - itself an integral part of any offensive - meant that the first essential task rested with the Royal Navy. The enemy had been attempting during the dark days of the spring to mine the garrison in. A route through the mines which infested the approaches to Grand Harbour had to be made. The work of the minesweepers can only be acknowledged when the story of the Royal Navy at Malta is fully told, but some indication of the problem which confronted them can be surmised from the fact that the only proper Oropesa sweeper had been sunk and almost every other sweeper damaged. Two harbour tugs, therefore, set about the job, and after just over a month of unremitting labour and gallant perseverance, a channel was completed the day the first convoy arrived.
Two convoys were expected in the middle of June, one from the east and one from the west. Strategical bombing was carried out from the island to assist the operation. These raids, made by Wellingtons, were first of all directed at the train ferry terminus at Messina. Then the submarine base at Augusta was bombed. Naples, Cagliari and Taranto were visited in turn as the convoy was setting sail.
The convoy from Egypt, after much bombing, was forced to turn back by the Italian fleet. The convoy from the west was also heavily attacked, an Italian cruiser force attempting to destroy it. The naval escort succeeded in chasing off the Italians, however, and Fleet Air Arm and Beaufort torpedo-bombers from Malta attacked them three times. But the convoy was slowed up under persistent air and submarine attacks. Only two ships arrived in Grand Harbour. One of them carried Royal Air Force reinforcements ; the following extracts are from the diary of a Flight Lieutenant who was with them :
" 15th June. 0300. Took an hour's watch on deck, and saw lights of Tunis. Flares dropped miles to the starboard. We had dodged the enemy. Alarm at 0630. On going on deck saw shells splashing in sea around us. Warships of the Italian Navy were attacking us. A heavy smoke screen was laid round convoy while our A.A. ships and four destroyers left us to give battle. Italian units were chased away. We were left only with minesweepers as escort and attacked by four or five planes of which one was brought down. A merchant-man was hit but continued in convoy for five or ten minutes, when smoke came from her stern and she gradually dropped behind, sinking slowly. Probably all on board saved, except those killed by bomb, understood actually to be seven. One plane was destroyed. The American oil tanker, which joined us at Gibraltar, then dropped out of convoy through engine trouble - later learnt caused by near miss. Destroyer stood guard. We then sailed past two German airmen floating in the sea who had escaped from their wrecked aircraft. They shouted ` Hil e ' to us, as if we who had nearly lost our lives through them should risk them even further by stopping to save their lives. They were picked up by warship. Stand down for breakfast at 0900 hours.
"0930. Our escort returned, and then again attacked Italian units to the south. Laying a smoke screen, we turned north-west. Understood later that our position seemed hopeless and we were making for a sandy beach in Tunisia, or at least to shelter in neutral waters until nightfall. Beaufighters and Spitfires now protecting convoy which was a hell of a relief.
" 1030-1100. Instructions cancelled and turned south again. Understood Italian Navy beat it, though had they stayed they could undoubtedly have sunk every one of us. We were informed that a strong escort from Malta was expected but had not turned up. Later learnt that this was probably escort of convoy from east which had already turned back and never reached Malta. Feeling very unhappy, especially as there was nothing I could do about it. It is far better to be one of the men on the guns hitting back at the enemy than to be a helpless nobody just waiting for anything to happen.
" 1100. Attacked by bombers. No direct hits, but another merchantman put out of action. Position of convoy now two sunk, two O.K. After stand down, several alarms, but fortunately only Spitfires until 1210.
" 1315. Alarm and immediate attack by bombers which were chased away by Spitfires from Malta. Depth charges dropped at 1405. Our warships firing at hostile surface craft. Travelling south-south-east at about thirteen knots. False alarm at 1415. It was a beautiful day, sea looking glorious with hardly a ripple. The only clouds were formed by dense smoke from burning oil. Alarm during afternoon. One bomber, but chased away by Spitfires.
" 1830. Great feeling of relief as worst danger was passed and we were now continuously escorted by Spitfires from Malta. Only fifty or sixty miles to go. The behaviour of the men on board had been magnificent, perfect calm and no grumbling though they were all kept below and just did not know what on earth was happening. Our warships now returned, having chased the Italians away for good. At about 1900 two or three Stuka dive-bombers bombed Troilus, dropping bombs within ten yards of starboard. Came out of saloon and saw splash, and then blown back in again by another exploding bomb. It was terrifying, and knees started knocking again after explosion. Could not hear engines and thought we too had ` had it ' but everything O.K., as I was temporarily deafened. We had been attacked out of the sun dead behind us. The cruiser, Troilus and Orari were all in direct line of sun. After raid we changed our positions.
" 2240. Alarm but bombers chased away. Now within a few miles of Malta and safety, but told it was too dark to enter harbour before dawn."
Once the ships were within range the Spitfire protection was most effective. They flew as many as 170 sorties in one day. The sky was theirs. No enemy aircraft came to bomb the ships while they were being unloaded. The cargo was handled by a combined force of civilians and Service personnel, including 2,500 soldiers, and was quickly removed to dispersal areas.
Although two ships, after a gap of months, were inadequate to replenish the island's supplies, they brought vital additions to the minesweeping strength and the Royal Navy was able to set about the mines which still fenced in approaches. Flour, fuel and ammunition were still needed and supplies of aviation spirit were seriously depleted.
On 20th June the Air Officer Commanding signalled to the Chief of Air Staff :
" Until further supplies of 100 octane reach this island all available 100 octane must be used for defence."
The Welshman meanwhile, running through alone in June and July, brought small supplies of various vital commodities and some spirit. " Sweeteners " of spirit also arrived from time to time by submarine. Nothing short of a large convoy, however, could readjust Malta's supply situation.
This battle for supplies was the battle within the Battle of Malta. There could only be the two routes, east and west. Common to both of them was the necessity for air superiority over that last hundred miles of the journey and during the unloading in harbour. The most vital supplies had been lost after they had been fought through to within sight of land ; more vital supplies had been destroyed within the harbour itself. It was the duty of the Royal Air Force in Malta to see that such losses were never repeated. By the summer of 1942 it had the strength for this, and the waters in the approaches and in the harbours were made relatively secure. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean convoy passage continued to be hazardous and was expensive in lives, ships and war materials.
FUEL FOR THE DEFENDERS. The tanker Ohio, deck almost awash, steering gear smashed, hit six times, and once set on fire, limps into Grand Harbour. One of the few survivors of the August convoy, she brought fuel at a time of desperate shortage. Malta's fighters keep the harbour safe, tugs bustle to her aid, and a destroyer, secured on her port side, keeps her steady.
In its early stages the route from Gibraltar was easier because the ships were able to steam far away from the enemy's bases. Only submarines menaced them. From the longitude of Sardinia, however, through the Sicilian narrows to some fifty miles east of Pantellaria, the ships had to make the most dangerous sea passage in the world. These narrow, mined waters were bounded on the one side by the unfriendly Vichy territory of Tunisia and upon the other by Axis shores, studded with naval bases and thick with airfields.
Until the Germans arrived in Sicily the inactivity of the Italian fleet and the frail constitution of the Regia Aeronautica let the convoys through almost unscathed. The Germans, with the Luftwaffe, U-boats, E-boats and moral pressure upon the Italian fleet, turned the narrows into a deathtrap for British shipping. This was not surprising. Indeed, had the position been reversed and British forces controlled both sides of this ninety-odd miles of canal, it is inconceivable that the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force would have allowed a single ship to pass through.
Conditions on the eastern route from Egypt varied with the fortunes of the Eighth Army in North Africa. For the short time it held Benghazi in the winter of 1941-2, ships could coast along the African shore under strong fighter cover and without necessarily revealing that their destination was Malta. The passage across the open sea could be accomplished largely at night, the edge of the island's air umbrella being reached by dawn. With good air reconnaissance the chances of interception by surface forces was slight. The route from the east deteriorated when the Eighth Army stood back on the El Alamein line. Not only were the convoys subject to continuous reconnaissance and attack both from the African and the Cretan shores, but ample time was given for the enemy to appreciate the situation and at his leisure to sail his battle fleet into a position to block the convoy's path.
The big August convoy was therefore planned to sail from England through the Straits of Gibraltar.
This August convoy, without which the besieged would be unable to hold out upon the rock, became the test for Malta's new-found air strength. The convoy was attacked through-out the eastward passage. The aircraft carrier Eagle was lost. Only six of the ships re-formed with the convoy at dawn on the fourth day. Two more of these were sunk by an attack that morning and things looked bad indeed when the all-important American tanker Ohio was immobilised west of Lampedusa. Four of the merchant ships eventually reached Grand Harbour. The story of the tanker Ohio, struggling in, supported on either side by destroyers, stirred the world, and it seems fitting that it should be retold in these pages in the words of a Leading Signaller of the Royal Navy who was aboard her.
" Only twenty-one hours to go, if we're lucky, and all merchantmen still afloat. We got over the first hour and then came trouble. On the Ohio we had seen two others get hit, and when ours came the shock didn't seem quite so had. There wasn't much noise about it. So little, in fact, that after I had made my way to the bridge I found the first mate, who was on watch at the time, quite unaware of the fact. It seemed a silly situation and I actually tapped him on the shoulder and said, ` Excuse me, Sir, but we've been hit and we are burning badly.'
" I made my way with him from the bridge to the deck below where the skipper, Mr. Mason, was already in the thick of things and with the rest of the available hands was setting about putting out the flames. He was truly a fine man to sail with, and the way he met this emergency fully justified our confidence in him. He told us that the flames could be extinguished and that there was nothing to worry about. That was good enough for everybody on board, and we set to and fought the fire. Four of the crew had jumped for it, two galley boys and two maritime gunners, but they were picked up by escorting destroyers.
" The fire was nearly under control when over came more enemy planes. It was a grim experience, bombs falling each side of us, and always the possibility of another torpedo attack. Another ship ahead of us was hit during this attack and she was ablaze from stem to stern. While we were fighting the fire the engineer below had been repairing damaged steam pipes. We were stationary now, and saw the rest of the convoy drawing away from us. The destroyer Ashanti came alongside to ask how we were getting on. Mr. Mason informed them that he would do his best to get to Malta alone, and Ashanti carried on with the job of escorting the convoy.
" After about half an hour the engineer reported that we could get under way again and would make nineteen knots if necessary. This was most heartening news and we got under way again. We had a quiet night, though we had little sleep, for we passed through the Straits of Pantellaria during the night and we did not expect to get through there unmolested. As dawn broke next morning we saw the convoy ahead. At 0600 we had re-formed the convoy; all that remained were six ships together with the crippled Ohio. At 0815 enemy bombers made another attack, and we had great difficulty in manoeuvring with the fleet as our steering was almost gone. The next attack was at 0935. Mines and bombs were dropped ; Ohio was hit twice and we stopped once more. A Stuka must have thought we were easy meat as he dived at us, but our Oerlikon gunners hit him and he crashed on the bows of the ship and showered us with debris.
" I must say a word of praise for our chief steward. While action was on he was cooking eggs and bacon and making tea which he brought to us at our posts as none of us had time to get below for our breakfast. The sight of him nipping round with a tray of breakfast made us forget our troubles for a while.
" Another merchantman was abandoned during the action and we saw the rest of the convoy disappearing over the horizon once again. Four merchantmen left. We will make five if we can get towed in. Two destroyers remained with us and bawled encouragement. ` Only a hundred miles to go ! ' shouted the skipper from one of them as he tried to take us in tow. It was a gallant effort, but we were too heavy and could not help at all by even steering ourselves.
" Eventually we left the Ohio and went aboard the destroyer and waited for assistance from Malta. Mr. Mason did not like leaving the Ohio at all, but it was decided that we would return on board her when assistance arrived and secure the lines of the towing ships and continue our journey under cover of darkness. Assistance arrived before dark, however, and we went on board and prepared towing gear. The steward took the opportunity of preparing sandwiches. He had just arrived on the bridge with them when over came some more aircraft. We received two more direct hits and one of our gunners was killed.
" The towing gear had been secured and we boarded the towing ships and made some little headway, but at dusk another attack developed and Ohio was hit again and the tow ropes parted. We circled round her all night, keeping anti-submarine patrol as we had done during the afternoon. When dawn broke she was still there but rather low in the water. Two destroyers secured themselves one each side of her and started on the last lap to Malta, sixty miles. We arrived in Malta twenty-four hours afterwards."
The part of Malta's air forces in this convoy operation was to establish the position of the Italian fleet by photographic reconnaissance, to provide patrols off the ports by night to watch for fleet movements, to shadow with Baltimores by day, and to maintain a patrol between Sicily and Sardinia as a precaution against the surprise of the surface forces. These intentions were carried out. The Italian fleet attempted to pass round the north-western point of Sicily during the night of 12th-13th August to attack the convoy at dawn. The enemy was successfully illuminated and attacked by Wellingtons, however, and shortly afterwards he was worried by dummy signals in plain language giving his position and ordering an imaginary attack by Royal Air Force Liberators. Possibly from these causes, he turned back, robbing the torpedo bombers of the Fleet Air Arm from Malta of their target, but running into submarine patrols, which torpedoed two of their cruisers.
Four hundred and seven sorties were flown to afford air protection for the convoy as soon as it was within range by Beaufighters and Spitfires. Low-flying Beaufighters also carried out attacks on airfields to ground Axis air forces. Night bombing sorties in support were made by Malta-based Liberators and by Liberators of the United States Army Air Force based in the Middle East.
Constant fighter patrols were flown during the unloading of the convoy but the enemy made only one half-hearted attempt, this time upon Grand Harbour with Ju. 88s, which the Spitfires drove away. The combined operation of handling and storing the cargoes was rushed through according to plan, while the crews and survivors of the merchantmen were feted by the people of the island.
There was some relief for the besieged. A slight moderation of the bread ration was possible. Oil fuel was easier and the A.A. ammunition supplies were satisfactory though not profuse. Aviation spirit and benzene still caused anxiety. The Air Officer Commanding signalled to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief that, provided air superiority over Malta could be maintained, ten weeks' fuel could be added to the present four weeks' stock.
