Air Fronts: Theaters of Operation - The Mediterranean - HMSO: The Air Battle of Malta - 5. Malta's Flashing Sword
THE AIR BATTLE OF MALTA. The Official Account of the R.A.F. in Malta, June 1940 to November 1942; PREPARED FOR THE AIR MINISTRY BY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION; London : His Majesty's Stationery Office 1944
V. Malta's Flashing Sword
JUNE-DECEMBER 1941
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh Pughe Lloyd, the new Air Officer Commanding, arrived in Malta in May, and found himself engaged by the Regia Aeronautica alone. Strategically, his chief preoccupation was to build up a striking force to attack the seaborne cargoes and the harbours serving Rommel. From the spring to the summer, Tripoli was almost the only port used by the enemy for the Libyan campaign. This allowed Malta not only to concentrate strong submarine forces against his routes east and west of Sicily, but to strike heavily with naval aircraft by night and with Blenheim bombers by day. The toll taken of shipping by Malta - then the only base from which an offensive could be made - induced the Axis to increase the armed escort for convoys. Later, when this proved useless, it became necessary to divert Axis shipping out of range of the island's flashing sword.
AT MAST HEIGHT, Blenheims attack an Italian timber vessel bound for Tripoli. On the starboard side one of the crew leaps overboard as a bomb bursts on the ship's stern
Early in May a large convoy, which included two tankers, reached Malta from the east ; there were two more large convoys from the west in July and September. A quantity of aviation spirit arrived which, though it displaced other stores, was a wise provision, for without it the island would scarcely have weathered the storms that were to come. The supply situation during the summer was excellent and anxiety was felt in some quarters that the standard of living was still far in excess of that enjoyed in Britain and, indeed, in most other parts of the warring world.
The Greek and Cretan campaigns were occupying the attentions of the units of the Royal Navy which had been based in Grand Harbour, and it was not until the autumn that the surface forces returned to their Malta-based successes. Meanwhile, auxiliary mine-sweepers cleaned up the magnetic and acoustic mines left over from the winter air attacks.
As soon as the Luftwaffe left Sicily, enemy air attacks on Malta were reduced. It was noted at the beginning of June that " attacks in which only a small proportion of the force employed actually crossed the coast, and in which bombs appeared to be deliberately dropped in the sea, have been a feature of this period ". More often it was an occasional low-flying attack, an occasional reconnaissance, an occasional attempt at bombing ; and for such efforts the Italians paid dearly. The Hurricane Mark Is were competent to deal with the Macchi 200 fighters which composed the main Italian force, and they were now reinforced with Mark IIs.
It was possible to operate one, sometimes two, squadrons of Wellington bombers, at least one squadron of Blenheims, and two squadrons of Fleet Air Arm aircraft. A large amount of work was carried out to fit the airfield for these offensive operations, and aircraft dispersal areas were provided. Directly after the fall of Crete anti-invasion measures were taken upon all the airfields, the runways being mined and possible landing places obstructed.
In June, while the opposing armies were building up their strength in Africa, Swordfish aircraft from Malta carried out three raids on shipping in Tripoli harbour ; Blenheims introduced mast-high attacks for the first time in the Mediterranean against shipping at sea, sinking two large ships and damaging three others ; and submarines from the island sank or damaged thirteen more. During the fort-night from 30th June to 13th July there were 122 bomber sorties from Malta, a record since the outbreak of war.
During the clear nights of the summer and early autumn of 1941 a certain amount of night-bombing took place. For the last year, since September 1940, there had been a night fighter organisation which had achieved a measure of success.
Brigadier (now Major-General) C. T. Beckett, Commander Royal Artillery, Malta, has explained the situation in these words :
" The conditions over Malta were unlike those anywhere in England, for not only were airfields within the gun-defended area, but it was usual for aircraft to arrive either from Egypt or Gibraltar nightly, for bomber flights to take place almost nightly, or for the Fleet Air Arm to carry out strikes or reconnaissance. Night fighters were usually up, and the enemy was also almost invariably present.
" The problem of dealing with all these factors (of which the most difficult were the arrival of strangers from Gibraltar inadequately briefed as to our plans, and the return of damaged bombers from Sicily, who were not always able or willing to comply with the rules) necessitated very clear cut instructions to the guns and searchlights, as well as to the air defences, if we were all to give of our best in support. Simplicity was essential, since personnel changed very rapidly, and any extended period of inactivity almost always meant beginning the work all over again, educating the pilots and the fighter controllers in the details of control."
Some flights of Hurricanes were now formed into a Malta Night Fighter Unit. The M.N.F.U. was a model of collaboration between searchlights, the gun operations room of the gunners, and the Hurricanes. The Army and the Royal Air Force together devised a scheme by which the island was divided into two parts, with Valetta upon the dividing line. At the approach of a raid, a Hurricane patrolled each area, being kept informed by radio of the speed, height and course of the raid. No orders were given to them as in day interception : it was up to them to place themselves on each side of the raider when he was about fifteen miles out. They would then turn in towards him and set course towards his presumed objective (usually Grand Harbour). The result was that when the raider was illuminated by the searchlights, there would be a Hurricane on either side of him, on a converging course and quite close. The enemy usually came in high and straight during this period, and an average taken over a number of months showed that out of every seven raiders which crossed the coast five were illuminated. Out of every five, three were attacked. Out of every three attacked, two were destroyed.
The searchlights and the radiolocation of the Royal Artillery acted as the eyes directing the Hurricanes' fire, and a very enthusiastic and profitable comradeship grew up between the soldiers and the night fighters. It was only the great pressure upon fighter strength in the early months of 1942 which finally caused the Unit's work to be called off. It was replaced in time by other methods.
From the beginning, Malta had been served by radiolocation which was, and is, the basis of every fighter operation both by day and, as instanced by the M.N.F.U., by night.
One event disturbed the relative lull in the enemy's assault on Malta in the summer of 1941. On the night of 25th July it was learned that a surface force was approaching the island. No special siren had been contemplated for shelling, so the ordinary air raid alert sounded just before midnight (an Axis raid having failed to synchronise with the approaching force). Fleet Air Arm Swordfish were ordered to readiness and Hurricanes stood by for first light.
Reports soon followed of the sound of motor-boat engines along the north-east coast of the island. The coastal defences, harbour batteries and searchlights, waited on tiptoe. In Grand Harbour was a newly arrived convoy. At their berths were our submarines. The teeth of Valetta were set and ready as the unknown force approached in the darkness.
Just before dawn a track was seen approaching St Elmo, the fortress promontory where the city of Valetta forms one jaw of the mouth of Grand Harbour. Just as the look-out at Tigne, the next headland, observed its wake, an explosion occurred on the breakwater viaduct, the first barrier to the harbour. Searchlights flashed on and disclosed a force of E-boats making for the scene of the explosion. The illuminated area was at once criss-crossed by a devastating fire from every close-range weapon which could bear - six-pounders at ranges from 500 to 3,000 yards, Bofors guns and machine-guns leapt into action. For two minutes the guns continued to fire. Then there was silence. There was nothing left to fire at.
As dawn broke, the guns found two more targets and destroyed them. Cannon Hurricanes were already out seeking the remainder of the retreating force. The attack was utterly broken. Twenty dead and eighteen prisoners were picked up. The whole attacking force had been disposed of. Later, this communique was issued :
" Shortly before 5 a.m. (local time) E-boats appeared off the entrance of Malta Harbour, and the fixed defences manned by the military garrison immediately engaged them. One E-boat was hit and blew up, and four were also destroyed by gunfire. It then appeared that the E-boats were acting as cover for the smaller torpedo-carrying craft which attempted to break into the harbour. These were also heavily engaged by gunfire from the shore defences, eight being blown up or sunk. None succeeded in entering the harbour.
" Fighters of the Royal Air Force pursued the remaining E-boats while they were attempting to extricate themselves, and our fighters were successful in sinking four more and damaging others. The British fighters then encountered enemy aircraft endeavouring to give air support to the retreating E-boats. Three enemy aircraft were shot down into the sea ; while one Royal Air Force fighter was lost, the pilot was saved.
"Reports so far received indicate that the assault on the harbour was made by eight small torpedo-carrying craft, all of which were destroyed. The view that none of the assaulting forces survived is confirmed by a special Italian communique issued on Saturday night. This merely referred to explosions seen by escorting forces from a distance to seaward."
The Voce d'Italia described the action in these words :
" The presence of the convoy was detected on Friday. Immediately the Italian Navy decided to attack with these tiny but powerful craft on which the designers have worked in silence for many years - one of the most precious secrets of the Italian war machine. The men chosen for the attack knew that retreat was impossible - they must be either killed or taken prisoner. None flinched before his task, despite the formidable nature of the British defences. The violation of Malta will go down in history as one of the most remarkable exploits of this war."
To cover the retreat of their gallant but foolhardy force, the Italians sent Macchi fighters which encountered the Hurricanes engaged in finishing off the boats in the first light of day. Three of these Macchis were destroyed. One of the Hurricanes, piloted by Pilot Officer (now Flight Lieutenant) D. Winton, came to grief. His adventures have been re-corded in a narrative kept by his squadron :
" Thirty miles or so out to sea, he was surprised by a Macchi and received such damage to his machine that his fan stopped. Using his speed to gain height, he was able to reach 700 feet and then baled out, both his parachute and dinghy doing all the things that a kind-hearted M.O. likes them to do. For the next few hours he sunbathed, played with a friendly turtle, wondered who would have his motor-cycle, and then spotted a stationary torpedo boat. He paddled the dinghy with his hands and, finding progress slow, towed it and swam towards the boat. By climbing up the side he was able to peer into it and was confronted by eight very much dead Italians.
" Taking possession of the boat was thus quite easy and as he couldn't start it, he waited, flying the flag at half mast, since he didn't know which side would rescue him. An Army rescue boat did a circuit round him - almost six hours after he had baled out on an empty stomach - and thinking he was an Italian, also that there was a .5 machine-gun on the boat, left him to cool his heels for a time. Before they could return a Swordfish with floats dropped in to pay him a visit and gave him, and the flag, a lift home, where he again took possession of his motor-cycle."
The Italians continued to overdo it. While their prisoners were being examined and their complete operational orders, captured with one of the boats, were being scanned, they broadcast this comment :
" The extraordinary communique published yesterday, announcing that the naval base of Malta was successfully forced by attacking units of the Italian Navy causing eight explosions, has been reproduced in bold type by all the European press, all of which underlines the unequalled dash of our sailors who have delivered a blow to the enemy right inside one of the most fortified naval bases of the world."
SHADOW OVER ROMMEL. As the bows of this Italian supply ship lift from the water, the shadow of the aircraft sweeps over her deck. Hugging the Tunisian coast, she was bound for Tripoli.
Finally, this episode may be summed up by quoting extracts from remarks in his report by Vice-Admiral, Malta, Vice-Admiral Sir Wilbraham Ford :
" The most remarkable thing about these very detailed and intricate orders is the almost complete absence of any reference to counter-action on our part. In this respect it is very noticeable that prior to the moment at which our counteraction developed - namely, when the viaduct was blown up and the fortress opened fire - the whole plan had been carried out with great determination and the time-table had been kept to with admirable exactitude. Within two minutes, however, of our opening fire, the attack had been completely defeated and there was never any further risk that the defences of the harbour would be penetrated. The harbour defences of Malta, largely manned by Maltese, scored an outstanding success in this, their first action, and to them must go the entire credit for maintaining the security of the harbour.
". . . The photographic reconnaissance on which the attack was to be based must have been at least four days old. In a desperate attempt to get photographs two bombers escorted by over thirty fighters were sent over, but thanks to the magnificent effort by our fighters both the bombers together with three fighters were shot down. . . . The determined search for, and the destruction of, every retiring M.T.B. by our Hurricanes turned a failure into a disaster."
MALTESE NOCTURNE. Drooping flares and fanning searchlights weave a flame-bright pattern of war.
INTO THE DARK. A pilot of the Fleet Air Arm takes off for a night attack.
During August and September 1941, while there was less enemy air activity, Malta-based Blenheims made a great name for themselves with low-level attacks. Flying in numbers of anything from two to ten, they struck from mast height at shipping at sea wherever it could be found. There were never more than two squadrons of Blenheims upon the island at one time, but they succeeded in sinking something like 50,000 tons of shipping in the course of their operations from April to November. Only the greatly increased escort strength which the Axis was forced to provide ultimately reduced their successes, and they then turned their attention to enemy transport on the roads and to airfields, with results which will appear later. Meanwhile, Swordfish of the Fleet Air Arm based at Hal Far airfield were even more successful with the offensive at night. They laid mines and attacked with torpedoes. From May to November they destroyed approximately 110,000 tons of enemy shipping, a further 130,000 being damaged.
Hurricanes with bombs were active in September, a typical operation being bombing raids on Comiso airfield in Sicily in order to ground Italian fighters while a convoy was entering Grand Harbour. In October the enemy slightly increased night bombing and daylight raids on Malta, and the island's offensive effort became sterner.
A strong force of the Mediterranean Fleet, including the four six-inch cruisers Penelope, Aurora, Ajax and Neptune, was based in Grand Harbour. These ships had already sunk an entire convoy off the Italian mainland and now constituted a threat to the Axis convoy line which could only be met by superior naval forces. On at least four occasions the Italians had had to give their merchantmen battleship escort. To cover each end of this threatened line, Wellingtons from Luqa airfield made a series of raids upon Naples and Tripoli.
While the great forces faced each other in the North African desert, poised upon a fulcrum of supplies and metal, the battle of reinforcement was being fought out round the isolated fortress of Malta. The Intelligence report, covering twenty-four hours during the middle of October, is an indication of the scope of the air operations, and incidentally records the first use of 4,000 lb. bombs in the Middle East theatre of war :
" OFFENSIVE. Night, 16th/17th October : Sixteen Wellingtons bombed Naples. Total bombs dropped, 36,000 lb. including three 4,000 pounders and sixteen 1,000 pounders. 100,000 leaflets dropped. Time over target, 2312 to 0103 hours. Two aircraft returned early, engine trouble. Silurificio torpedo factory probably razed by 11,000 lb. of bombs. Hits also observed on railway, engine sheds, docks, Royal Arsenal, factory buildings, I.M.A.M. Airframe Works, Alfa Romeo Works. Whole target was well alight and fires seen many miles away. Opposition: light A.A. intense, fired as barrage. Little inaccurate heavy A.A.
"Day, 17th October : Six Blenheims with Hurricane escort bombed seaplane base Syracuse, 0850 hours. Total bombs dropped, 6,000 lb. from 12,500 feet. Bursts seen on target. Three Blenheims attacked by fighters on return journey. Claim hits on enemy aircraft which was pouring smoke from engine; unlikely to reach base. Six Blenheims in pairs bombed and machine-gunned M.T. on roads between Zuara and Sirte. Total bombs dropped, 5,750 lb. Es Zauia airfield bombed, one C.R. 42 definitely destroyed, others damaged. Barracks and guard house blown up. Two lorries and trailer blown off road, others damaged. One armoured car damaged. Two Blenheims slightly damaged A.A. All aircraft returned safely from all operations."
The submarines from Malta were also scoring well. In September they sank or damaged four ships, in October eight, and in November seven. Supplies to Libya wilted and for a time virtually ceased. The Italians had to bring out almost their entire battle fleet to escort one important convoy across.
On 18th November the Eighth Army began its general advance into Cyrenaica. Malta-based aircraft had flown 453 bomber sorties during the preparatory period from 13th October to 11th November ; and air operations from the island were naturally now dete-mined by the development of this, as it was to prove, abortive campaign. At first the weather was unfavourable, but as it cleared Malta's supporting offensive was built up again. Once more the enemy determined to " sink " the island, to gain domination over the rock without which the Mediterranean could never be theirs. The expected increase of their support came in December. The Luftwaffe returned to Sicily.
