Allied Air Power Doctrine Overview

Military doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and principles that describe and guide the proper use of forces in military operations. It is what we have come to understand, based on our experience to date. Doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge gained primarily from the study and analysis of experience, which may include actual combat or contingency operations."

(Department of the Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine, AFDD-1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Force Doctrine Center, 1997))

"Our production of aircraft, fighters and bombers, judged by every possible test, already far exceeds the Germans'.

The Russian production is about equal to ours, and the American production alone is double or treble the German production.

When I speak of production I mean not only that of aircraft, not only that of the machines, but of all the vast organisation, the training schools and acillary services which minister to our power, whithout whose efficiency air power could not manifest itself."

(Winston Churchill, 1944.)

This section is not intended to present a concise interpretation of the genesis, differences and relations of air power theories and doctrines of the various air services before and during WWII. The research required is beyond the scope of this web site at present.

However, in an attempt to present the various elements of air power doctrine - esp. the evolving differentiation of tactical and strategic applications of air power - a few "operations reports" are included here.

No attempt will be made to put them into historic perspective, analyze their genesis or development or compare them to more modern doctrines.

Table of Contents

Target Germany. The US Army Air Force´s official story of the VIII Bomber Command´s first year over Europe, British Edition 1944, extracts

This text is presented to come by the specifics of the AAF doctrine of precicion daylight bombing in some detail. It provides an illustration to FM 100-20 in this regard. An internal after the war critique and asessment of the strategic bombing campaing can be found here: PDF

Interdiction. How Air can perform the enormous task of isolating a battlefield; IMPACT, Vol. 2 No. 11, November 1944, Assitant Chief of the Air Staff, Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

This article illustrates the part of FM 100-20 dealing with tactical application of air power.

Invasion of France; IMPACT, Vol. 2 No. 7, July 1944, Assitant Chief of the Air Staff, Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

This one brings it all togther.