Allied Air Power Doctrine: Royal Air Force War Manual; Volume I - Chapter 14: Air Operations in undeveloped and semi-civilized Countries

General Considerations

1. In the preceding chapters air operations have been considered in relation to great wars in which the combatants are nations highly organized politically, socially and industrially. In such wars, the equipment of the two fighting forces is similar and highly complex and scientific in character, with the result that air operations have to be carried out in the face of air opposition.

2. This chapter deals with air operations against an enemy who has little or no industrial organization, and whose social and political system is comparatively primitive in form. Such an enemy, although generally lacking in military organization and ill-equipped with modern weapons, will normally be operating in country familiar to himself and ill-suited to civilized arms. In such circumstances, with his forces almost self-supporting and therefore dispensing with lines of communication and unencumbered by complicated equipment, he forms a mobile and elusive enemy.

3. The principles laid down in chapters I, VII, VIII and IX for the conduct of air operations hold good whether the enemy is a highly developed nation, or an uncivilized tribe maintaining a precarious existence by raising stock or cultivating the soil. Their application must, however, be largely modified to meet the special conditions under which operations against the latter must be conducted.

The Characteristics of Operations against a Semi-civilized Enemy

4. (i) Active operations against a semi-civilized enemy are usually undertaken with the aim of either :

(a) creating or restoring law and order within a country's borders, or

(b) subduing a turbulent or troublesome people on or beyond a country's frontiers.

(ii) In operations of the second category the enemy may often possess some degree of organization and administrative control, but in operations directed to secure the maintenance of law and order resistance will generally be more individual in character and dependent for cohesion upon common interests, common religion and a loose tribal system or organization. The nature of the operations and the method of conducting the campaign will vary considerably according to the object for which they are undertaken and the social and military organization of the enemy against whom they are directed.

5. In some instances the enemy organization may present clearly defined objectives, the capture or effective attack of which will prove decisive in overcoming resistance. In such cases the strategy adopted may differ little in character from that applicable to major wars. But such vulnerable organizations will more often exist only in a minor degree, and the selection of suitable objectives vital to the enemy may under these conditions —either in the case of a protracted and difficult campaign or in that of a single demonstration in support of the police—become difficult.

6. Such operations usually take place in undeveloped country, and the problems they present are more often connected with the natural difficulties of movement and communications than with the active opposition of the enemy. The most determined foes are generally those who inhabit the least accessible localities.

7. Information as to the strength of the enemy and the extent of his resources is normally difficult to obtain, and the country in and over which operations take place is almost always unfamiliar. The enemy on the other hand is fighting on his own ground, where his observation and intelligence services are as a rule very efficient. In order to make full use of air power, an efficient intelligence service is most essential.

8. Operations to suppress turbulence or insurrection present other peculiar difficulties. The time and location of the outbreak are often unexpected, and its focus and extent difficult to ascertain. Firm and immediate action is needed if its further extension is to be prevented, and this action must be taken with the necessity for the subsequent resettlement of the district always in view.

General Effect of the Employment of Aircraft

9. Where the organization of enemy is sufficiently developed to present objectives vulnerable to air attack, the safeguarding of which is vital to their resistance, the strategy of air operations will not differ materially from that already discussed in connection with major wars, with the qualification that air opposition will normally be absent. But the absence of vulnerable organizations is a normal characteristic of operations against a semi-civilized enemy, and, apart from the peculiar difficulties of country and climate, it is this feature which gives rise to the principal problems of such operations. Air operations will therefore be discussed in this chapter on the assumption that such objectives do not exist. Where in practice they do present themselves in any degree the employment of aircraft must be modified accordingly.

10. The problem in operations against semi-civilized peoples, as in greater wars, is to induce the enemy to submit, with the minimum destruction of life and property and with due regard to economy in time, money and energy.

11. A military force may achieve this aim by advancing into hostile territory with the intention of capturing definite enemy strongholds and establishing and occupying fortified posts. Such an advance normally causes the enemy to concentrate in defence thus providing for the advancing force an immediate objective.

12. The occupation of the country and the consequent curtailment of the freedom of the people follows on the destruction of the enemy's fighting force. This kind of occupation cannot, however, always be maintained, and with the withdrawal of the invading force the enemy resumes his ordinary routine of life and after a time is ready once more to give trouble.

13. Where the enemy presents no fixed objectives and refuses to stand and fight, the expedition resolves itself into the chase of a highly mobile enemy by a more powerful but necessarily less mobile pursuer with, frequently, indecisive results. In such circumstances the uncivilized enemy looks upon war rather in the light of a game. As long as he can inflict casualties, has an opportunity of capturing loot, or can outwit his opponent on his own ground, he is prepared to regard fighting as part of the routine of existence.

14. The employment of aircraft against such an enemy practically places out of his reach all these inducements to fight. It also obviates the necessity for vulnerable lines of communication through hostile and difficult country. And, apart from the occasional casualty due to enemy action or engine failure, it removes the risk of tactical defeat with its ensuing moral encouragement to the enemy, which is out of all proportion to its material effect.

15. The use of air forces enables air operations to be undertaken against an enemy from any distance within operating range of any secure and suitable landing ground, almost irrespective of the nature of the intervening country. Air operations can be commenced without the delays inseparable from the organization and advance of a land expedition. This rapidity of action may enable air forces, by a timely demonstration, to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. And when the blow is necessary, it can be struck with as much or as little warning as may be desired and its strength and direction can be varied according to requirements.

16. Air bombardment is effective against material objectives such as the towns, villages or possessions of the enemy. Casualties amongst personnel can only be effectively inflicted when the enemy are concentrated, and unless he can be surprised, such opportunities cannot be counted upon. Aircraft can, however, by persistent harassing interrupt indefinitely the norma] life of a people. They may endeavour to withstand such attacks by deserting their villages and fields and taking shelter in natural refuges such as caves, or by billeting them-selves on other tribes who as " friendlies " are outside the zone of operations. But such methods of evasion entail an interruption of normal life which can be enforced by properly directed air attack until the enemy is ready to make terms.

17. Aircraft are at a disadvantage when the enemy are located in particularly close or broken country, and have few territorial ties and possessions : when, in other words, they can avoid air attack without undue interruption of their normal life. Aircraft are also at a disadvantage when friendly and hostile tribes are intermixed. In such circumstances the best chance of success lies in a well planned combination of the mobility of aircraft with the direct action of land forces.

18. (i) In brief, the effectiveness of air power employed against a semi-civilized enemy is dependent upon :

(a) The location and security of suitable air bases.

(b) The topography and area of the hostile country.

(c) The organization and mode of life of the enemy.

(ii) Where the enemy is dependent upon settled activities or possessions which are vulnerable to air attack and which lie within operating range of secure air bases, air power unaided may be capable of achieving a decision.

(iii) In unfavourable conditions where air attack alone cannot be rendered decisive, aircraft should be employed either in co-operation with land forces or in indirect support of land operations as circumstances require.

The Selection of Objectives in Air Operations

19. The material objectives presented by a semi-civilized enemy are seldom of such individual importance that the destruction of one or more of these will prove decisive. The problem therefore usually becomes one of interrupting the normal life of the enemy people to such an extent that a continuance of hostilities becomes intolerable. This is complicated by the fact that such a people normally live in a number of independent communities the reduction of any one of which has comparatively little effect on the resistance of the whole. The relative importance of these communities to the fighting power and determination of the enemy is dependent upon tribal organization and upon political as well as military considerations. This is an important factor in the selection of objectives.

20. In the absence of vulnerable organizations, attacks on the mode of life of the enemy have to be carried out directly against the people themselves or their possessions, and in this connection it is important that the aim of the operations should be borne in mind. If the aim is punitive and a severe lesson is intended, the infliction of heavy casualties or the destruction of their possessions may be necessary. But if the aim is the re-settlement of a district, it is most desirable to avoid widespread destruction which may result in a state of famine or deprive the people of their livelihood, thereby creating  the very conditions which are most conducive to lawlessness. For these reasons the selection of the correct air objectives demands a comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the psychology of the enemy and of his customs and characteristics, which can only be expected from those who have made a special study of the people. The choice is therefore governed primarily by political considerations and should be made only after due consultation with the political authorities in the locality.

21. The fighting forces of the enemy seldom present a suitable objective, and even if concentrated to oppose a land advance, the targets that they offer to air attack are comparatively small and fleeting. Consequently, air objectives will normally be limited to enemy habitations, his possessions, and the personnel gathered in their vicinity. Crops, even when ripe, are difficult to destroy effectively from the air, and their destruction, therefore, should be attempted only under the most favourable conditions.

22. In most undeveloped countries movement on a large scale is confined by natural features to a limited number of roads and tracks, which either run along stream beds or converge on focal points such as water supplies or passes through mountains. It is at focal points such as these that opportunities will occur for effective attacks.

23. No single objective of decisive importance can be expected to present itself in this form of warfare, and it is through the cumulative effect of well directed and sustained air attacks on the morale of the enemy that the commander will normally seek to bring about their submission.

Methods of Air Attack

24. One of the first essentials to the success of air attack is its accurate delivery, and this is complicated in most undeveloped countries by the similarity of the natural features, the lack of accurate maps, and the absence of artificial land-marks, such as railways or distinctive buildings. A knowledge of the country is therefore of the greatest importance to all air personnel who may be called upon to take part in such operations. No opportunity should be neglected of developing this topographical knowledge, particularly in liaison with the political services, or of adding to the store of intelligence and maps available by means of air photo-graphs and reconnaissance reports.

25. Political action is of particular importance in relation to air operations and will normally precede the commencement of any operations where hostilities are not initiated by the enemy themselves. Air operations depend largely for success on their moral effect and, once they have been commenced, any suspension of effort for further political action, before the final submission of the enemy, detracts from their effectiveness. Also, air action can begin quickly, and it is most important that this attribute should not be allowed to precipitate operations, the aim of which might be attained by political means. Consequently, air action should not be resorted to until these means have been exhausted and then only after the situation has been made clear to the enemy by a definite ultimatum.

26. The ultimatum will usually include a warning that air attacks may be commenced after a certain time and date, and that women and children should accordingly be removed to places of safety. This action may prevent surprise, but it should obviate the useless destruction of life which would be likely to prejudice the subsequent re-settlement of the district.

27. Even at this late stage of negotiations, demonstrations by aircraft in strength, made over the hostile elements in conjunction with the delivery of the warning, may have the effect of achieving submission without offensive action. Once it has become certain that air attack is necessary, no half measures should be considered, and operations must begin and be maintained with adequate forces until their aim is definitely attained.

28. The calculation of the strength of air forces necessary to carry out any such operation is a matter which calls for experience and a careful study of the circumstances : but operations should not be begun without reasonable certainty that adequate aircraft are available to bring them to a successful conclusion.

29. Although warnings may have been issued, the attainment of surprise at the outset of the operations may still be possible, and may be facilitated by careful timing between the expiration of the ultimatum and the delivery of the first attacks. The aim of these first attacks should be to catch the enemy when, by previous intelligence, it is known that they are likely to be congregated at focal points such as their villages or water supply. Surprise during subsequent operations can be repeated by calculated variations of the times and methods of attack. Long delays, or the suspension for a considerable period of operations against any individual target, even though deliberately devised with a view to regaining surprise, seldom achieve their object and tend to weaken the moral effect of air attack.

30. During the initial stages, the enemy villages may be expected to offer the most favourable objectives and attacks against them must therefore be made in maximum strength and continued while the opportunity offers. As operations progress, the enemy people will learn by experience to conceal themselves and their possessions from air attack. But even when their habitations are deserted, some value may be gained from the destruction of these by air bombardment. This, however, should only be attempted when highly effective results are obtainable, because the constant heavy bombing of empty areas without equivalent results reduces the moral effect of such bombardments.

31. Once the enemy has been driven to take refuge, fewer objectives for attack will offer, but this in itself is a sign that their routine of life has been effectually interrupted. The strength of air attacks should now be abated because the effect of heavy air attacks on the morale of the enemy depends in the main on the casualties and material losses inflicted by the earlier attacks when targets are good, and further heavy attacks after the enemy has taken cover are not likely to produce results equivalent to the efforts they require.

From this point onward, the use of air power should be directed towards harassing the enemy and maintaining the interruption in their normal life which has been achieved. If any attempts are made to resume even those most essential activities they should be immediately checked and further casualties inflicted. In this way the moral effect produced in the earlier attacks will be prolonged or increased, and the enemy eventually forced into submission.

32. By daylight, this result can best be achieved by surprise patrols flown over varying routes at varying hours, with the object of attacking personnel or any movement in the open. The occasional dropping of a bomb on likely objectives varied sometimes by a heavier attack, or the attack of some likely cover by low-flying aircraft with bomb or machine-gun fire may have great moral effect. Where the enemy possesses secure refuges near to their grazing or water, it may be necessary to maintain continuous patrols in the vicinity so that all movement may be subjected to attack.

33. The enemy will almost certainly attempt to take advantage of darkness to go about their essential work ; night attacks are therefore very important to the effective restriction of movement. These attacks are not only of particularly high moral value, but they add so greatly to the enemy's difficulties and privations brought about by the daylight bombardment that, when they can he delivered with sufficient frequency, they are a very effective means of hastening submission. Where night-flying is impracticable, bombs with varying long-delay fuzes may be dropped in daytime to achieve a similar result, but it may be desirable o give the enemy due notice before this form of attack is employed.

34. In all forms of attack, to obtain the maximum effect the type of bomb must be suited to the objective to be engaged. These will normally be either :

(i) Personnel and movement in the open—light bombs with high fragmentation or machine-gun fire will be most effective.

(ii) Habitations, usually stoutly built stone or mud-walled structures against which only heavy bombs are effective ; or lightly built reed or fabric shelters which should be attacked with light bombs or incendiaries.

or (iii) Crops, which should be attacked only when ripe and under the most favourable conditions, with incendiary bombs.

35. Occasions may occur during air operations when by mischance personnel will fall into the hands of the enemy, who will almost certainly seek o use their possession as a means of gaining immunity from air attack or obtaining favourable terms. Such an eventuality must not be allowed to influence the conduct of the operations. The realization of this fact by the enemy, coupled with the certainty of subsequent retribution if ill treatment should occur, is in the end the best protection for prisoners.

36. The main principles then governing the employment of aircraft are (a) intensive and sustained attack with the object of inflicting casualties and loss while good targets are afforded and (b) the suspension of the normal life of the enemy to the greatest possible extent.

Aircraft in Co-operation with Land Forces

37. In chapter XII, the principles governing the employment of aircraft in co-operation with land forces are enunciated. These principles remain unaltered in warfare against a semi-civilized enemy, but their application varies with the differences in the nature of the military operations, the country, and the weapons of the enemy.

38. As air operations against a semi-civilized enemy will normally be carried out unopposed from the air, there need be no diversion of effort from the main operations to secure air superiority. Co-operating units will therefore be free o carry out direct co-operation unhampered.

39. A semi-civilized enemy is essentially an opportunist, making the most of every chance that is offered, only occasionally laying himself open to attack, and then only for brief periods. He is assisted in this by the nature of the country, by his freedom from the embarrassments of a highly organized supply, and by the difficulty of identification which exists where all men are dressed alike and where a hostile section may be living in the midst of friendlies. For this reason, aircraft, irrespective of the duty on which they may be employed, should be able to take advantage of any passing opportunity by the attack of fleeting targets with bombs or machine-gun fire. Accordingly, all co-operating aircraft should normally carry bombs and machine guns, and an integral part of their duties should be the attack of any target that will assist the movement of the troops on the ground.

40. The main duties of aircraft in co-operation are the location of the enemy, the support of our troops and observation of artillery fire. Carried out as they normally must be in close, mountainous or unmapped country, these duties present special features not encountered in major wars.

41. The location of the enemy under such conditions is often a most difficult task, but a closely pressed search by aircraft, even if unsuccessful, will greatly restrict hostile movements. Aircraft are effective in searching and covering reverse slopes in support of picquetting operations, and their use in this way may enable a military commander to reduce the number of picquets sent out. In default of other means, they can be used for communicating with outlying posts. The assistance which aircraft can give to troops on the ground will often depend on the troops indicating from which direction their advance is being opposed.

42. Aircraft provide a particularly effective means of supporting locally raised irregulars or inexperienced native troops whose morale may require stiffening. Low-flying aircraft of the single or two-seater type operating in their vicinity will raise the morale of such troops and they are equally effective in shaking that of the enemy.

43. The duty of observing for artillery may be rendered more difficult by steep slopes in mountainous country. Lack of reliable maps may restrict the use of air observation to that required for pre-arranged shoots and direct attack by the aircraft themselves on " fleeting opportunity " targets may often be more effective than artillery fire beyond direct artillery observation.

44. To facilitate both security and maintenance, aircraft should as far as practicable be kept concentrated. But it is essential that air forces should preserve close touch with the land forces with whom they are co-operating, and, during an operation, air observers must be fully informed of the situation up to the moment of their leaving for a flight. For these reasons, advanced aerodromes or landing grounds must be provided as near to the fighting troops as possible.

45. The selection of aerodromes and landing grounds should be carried out by air force personnel in consultation with the military staff, and due consideration should be given to the suitability of sites from the point of view of flying facilities, access, communications, water supply, etc., as well as their location from the point of view of defence.

46. (i) It is important in this form of operation, not only that aircraft in flight should be able to communicate with troops in the ground, but also that troops on the ground should be able to communicate with aircraft in the air. Some means of two-way signal communication is therefore necessary. It is not always possible to maintain W/T apparatus with the fighting troops in view of the nature of the country through which they may be operating. Aircraft can communicate with the troops by message-dropping, but the picking-up of messages by aircraft may often be impracticable and some recognised method of visual signalling from the ground should always be available.

(ii) An air force liaison officer should be attached to an advancing column and should be available to give advice to a column commander regarding the use of aircraft co-operating, and in the selection of suitable landing grounds. He should be equipped, where practicable, with means of W/T communication with both aircraft in the air and the nearest aerodrome.

Air Operations in Support of Land Operations

47. In addition to the direct assistance of the fighting troops, aircraft may be used in many ways to facilitate the progress of military operations. Air operations may be directed against some quite remote objective, the attack of which may reduce the strength of enemy opposition or lower their morale. They may also be employed in overcoming some of the natural difficulties which hamper land operation in undeveloped countries.

48. Land operations or military occupations are handicapped by the necessity of providing outlying posts which may become isolated, and the capture of which becomes a moral asset to the enemy out of all proportion to its military effect. Aircraft are valuable as a rapid means of supporting the garrison of such posts when threatened by the enemy. Air action taken as soon as a hostile movement is reported may deter other doubtful elements from rising and thus deprive the movement of their support : whilst the means of communication and of emergency supply which aircraft provide may ward off disaster and ensure successful resistance.

49. Land operations are dependent upon land lines of communication, and in an undeveloped country these are a great source of weakness, necessitating considerable detachments in the form of posts and escorts. Air patrols over such communications, while not obviating the need for detachments, sustain the morale of the garrisons and discourage attacks upon convoys. The repeated appearance of aircraft may be the deciding factor in maintaining the neutrality of a potentially hostile area on the lines of communication.

50. (i) Aircraft can also render certain ancillary services which may be almost decisive in their effect on minor operations. Transportation aircraft are able o convey parties of troops in an emergency to points at which if conveyed by other means they would arrive too late.

(ii) Casualties in warfare against an uncivilized enemy are an embarrassment to a commander out of all pro-portion to their numbers, but if aircraft are available they can be evacuated by this means with fewer ill effects than by any other means. Also essential supplies of all descriptions can be successfully dropped by means of a parachute where their provision would otherwise be impossible.

Employment of Air Forces in Support of Civil Administration

51. The basis of law and order in an uncivilized country is a sound and strong administration. The strength of an administration in the eyes of a native is judged by its capacity to mete out suitable and adequate punishment without delay when misbehaviour occurs. For this purpose aircraft are particularly well suited though their use is naturally limited by the qualification mentioned in para. 18 of this chapter.

52. Air bombardment may have a high moral effect without excessive material damage, while unnecessary casualties, e.g., among women and children, can be avoided by the issue of due warnings. In very close country and in certain cases, such as the suppression of a turbulent minority in an otherwise inoffensive town, air bombardment is less suitable than military action. Normally, however, air action is effective without being too severe, and it has a deterrent effect which greatly reduces the number of occasions on which punishment is necessary.

53. Air bombardment, unlike military action, offers no opportunity to the enemy for profitable retaliation, and resistance to it is correspondingly shortened, while its rapidity of action may enable an outbreak to he localized and sterilized in its inception. Air forces, owing to their mobility and wide radius of action, can he kept concentrated and the necessity thus avoided of providing weak detachments and garrisons which are liable to lead to trouble by presenting opportunity to the native for initial success and loot.

54. The main principle governing the employment of aircraft in the maintenance of order is to concentrate them at a few central air bases well secured by adequate military garrisons. From these centres the aircraft can cover wide areas, and given well-organized signal communications can keep in touch with local administrations and render rapid support to local forces.

55. The air bases naturally require organized lines of communication : but these lines are rendered less liable to interruption by the rapidity with which air action can be taken at any point along them ; and less sensitive, by the potentialities of air transport in an emergency.