Allied Air Power Doctrine: Royal Air Force War Manual; Volume I - Chapter 6: Protection
General Considerations
1. So great are the advantages of surprise that every commander who undertakes an offensive operation will endeavour so to conceal his intentions and movements as to be able to deliver his attack before his adversary is able to meet it effectively. It is essential, therefore, that any force should at all times be protected from surprise. This is the first responsibility of a commander.
2. If an enemy can be prevented from obtaining information regarding his opponent's dispositions, his chances of making a successful attack will be minimised. This protection will be provided in the air mainly by the maintenance of air superiority and on land by the action of the fighting troops in the theatre of operations, but also by efficient communications, intelligence and observation services.
3. The mobility, speed and manoeuvrability of aircraft and their peculiar powers of evasion are such that to obtain a fully adequate warning of an air attack requires provision of an observation zone sited at a distance of many miles in advance of the points to he protected. If it is impracticable to establish such a zone, the element of surprise may be reduced by warnings conveyed through the medium of the anti-aircraft defence organisation.
4. Even a powerful anti-aircraft defence organization cannot, however, guarantee fully adequate warning nor can it afford immunity from air attack. The existence of such an organization does not absolve commanders from the responsibility of providing local protection for their command when in the air, at rest or on the move.
5. The method of protection varies with every situation ; therefore, each situation must be considered on its merits.
6. (i) The strength, composition and disposition of a protective force will, among other factors, depend upon
(a) the size of the force to be protected,
(b) the disposition of neighbouring friendly forces,
(c) meteorological conditions,
(d) the strength, composition, disposition and proximity of the enemy,
(e) the characteristics of the enemy.
(ii) No larger force than is necessary should be employed on protective duties.
7. The commander of a protective force, whatever its nature, whether large or small and wherever situated, must keep his force in such readiness for action as the circumstances require.
8. Commanders must ensure the co-ordination of all plans for the protection of forces under their command, and for the security of the territory occupied by such forces, against enemy action. This responsibility may involve the assumption of control over the civilian population and will always necessitate the establishment of relations with the civilian authorities.
9. Special consideration must always be given to the probability of gas attacks and the protective measures to be adopted.
Protection when in the air
10. No tactical plan can be successful unless adequate provision is made for the safety of the force and for its security against surprise. This can best be assured by the skilful disposition and employment of aircraft in the air in such a manner as to afford adequate warning and to bring the maximum concentration of fire to bear upon the enemy.
11. Fire power will depend upon effective tactics, cohesion of the force, manoeuvrability, alertness, a high standard of discipline and constant consideration of the changing tactics of the enemy.
12. Apart from the protection given them by the attainment of air superiority which is discussed in chapter VII, aircraft will as a general rule provide for their own protection on their way to and from objectives : they should therefore operate in formation, by which means alone are the development of maximum fire power and mutual support attainable.
13. Since the cohesion of a formation is so essential to its protection, the enemy will endeavour to disorganize it in order that it may be defeated in detail. This must be resisted. When a formation of aircraft is subjected to attack by the action of anti-aircraft gun fire alone, it may open in order to minimize the effect of such action, but the greatest care must be taken to ensure that the formation does not become disorganized and that it is able to reform immediately in the event of combined action by hostile aircraft.
14. Only in very exceptional circumstances will the employment of fighter aircraft as an escort to a formation offensively employed be justified. They are liable to be drawn off from the formation which they are intended to protect because they can use only offensive tactics.
15. Transport aircraft cannot adequately protect themselves ; they should, therefore, be given direct protection by the employment of other aircraft whenever they carry out important transport duties and are liable to air attack.
Protection when at rest
16. Aircraft at rest are very vulnerable to attack from the sea, the ground and the air.
17. Sea-borne aircraft, normally carried in aircraft carriers operating with a naval force, are protected by that force from both sea and air attack. Shore-based aircraft within range may also assist in their protection.
18. When air units are employed on army co-operation duties with a military force, the commander of that force will arrange for their protection when at rest and on the move.
19. Aerodromes will normally be situated in rear of the fighting troops or in friendly territory and will therefore be comparatively free from attacks by ground forces, while aircraft bases, depots and parks will always be located in areas which are protected from both land and sea attack, and as far out of range of hostile air attack as is consistent with efficiency.
20. In a theatre of operations where there is no danger of attack from the air, air forces will be so situated as to obtain the maximum protection against other forms of attack consistent with the efficiency of the force. The first consideration in the protection of an air force at rest, operating against an enemy employing air forces, will be defence against air attack, and, in the case of air forces at rest, operating against an enemy without air forces, will be defence against land attack. In the former case, the probability of land attack—especially by mechanized forces—must always be carefully considered.
21. The maximum damage to air forces at rest may be inflicted by surprise air attacks. These may be carried out from low altitudes until the enemy can be forced by effective defence measures to operate from high altitudes when material destruction and moral effect will be lessened. It is essential, therefore, that the defence should be organized with a view to its being put into operation with the utmost rapidity.
22. Among the points which should receive consideration in the protection of air forces at rest are
(i) Lay-out of hangars and buildings. It is impracticable to provide hangars and technical buildings which will afford adequate protection from air attack ; therefore, when attack by air is to be anticipated, they should be laid out at irregular angles, dispersed, and sited as inconspicuously as possible without impairing the general efficiency of the unit. They should be camouflaged and protected by splinter-proof walls or parapets. The height of the walls or parapets will vary with the type of aircraft accommodated. When protection against land attack only is necessary, hangars and buildings should be concentrated, in order to facilitate the task of defence.
(ii) Position of defence posts. These should be selected with a view to bringing the maximum concentration of fire to bear upon the enemy. Defence posts may be manned by machine gun and Lewis gun personnel or by small groups using small arms.
(iii) Warning of attack. Prompt warning of attack is essential to successful defence. If sufficient warning is given, every effort must be made to support the ground defences by employing all available and suitable aircraft.
(iv) Precautions against fire and sabotage. Since it is impracticable to protect the roofs of hangars against bomb attack, aircraft inside them are particularly vulnerable to destruction by fire. Therefore, every precautionary measure must be taken. The possibility of acts of sabotage should always receive consideration, particularly so when air forces are operating from advanced landing grounds in enemy country.
(v) Protection for personnel.--Buildings for occupation by personnel (unless land attack is to be expected) should be situated as far away from hangars and technical buildings as is consistent with efficiency. In the event of an attack on a large scale, personnel should occupy their defence posts, but in small attacks this may be inadvisable ; therefore, shelter trenches and dug-outs should be provided in the vicinity of the buildings for such reserve as the commander may consider advisable to hold and for personnel not forming part of the active defence.
23. An aerodrome may be temporarily unserviceable as a result of an air attack. Emergency landing grounds should therefore be prepared for the reception of aircraft which may be due to return. The laying out of dummy aerodromes in order to deceive the enemy should also be considered.
Protection when on the move
24. Commanders are responsible for the protection of all transport and supply units whose movements they regulate, and will make such provision for their security as the situation may demand.
25. Sea-borne aircraft on the move are protected by the naval forces with which they are co-operating. Aircraft working in co-operation with military forces are likewise protected by those forces during movement by land.
26. The normal movements of air forces other than aircraft in a theatre of operations are carried out by railway, inland water and road. These movements will take place in areas to the rear of the fighting troops and will thus normally be protected against ground attack and, to a certain extent, against hostile air attack.
27. It is a principle of air defence that every commander in addition to arranging for the protection of his command from surprise by hostile aircraft, is at all times responsible for dealing by small arms fire from the ground with hostile aircraft flying over his command and within effective range of small arms fire.
28. Railways and inland water-ways. Responsibility for the protection of a railway and of working parties on it rests with the commander of the area concerned. The responsibility of the railway service in this matter is confined to bringing to the notice of the commander such points on a railway as specially require protection.
29. Armoured trains are a valuable means of providing for the security of a line of railway in open country. They may be employed to connect detached posts and to patrol, at irregular intervals, sections of the line which are liable to attack. The security of the line in rear of the train should always be provided for.
30. It is the duty of commanders of air force units moving by railway or operating from a train in a theatre of operations, to ensure that all possible means of protection against both air and ground attack are provided. The same will apply to the protection of air forces using inland water-ways.
31. Road movements. The personnel and equipment of air forces in a theatre of operations move by means of mechanical transport vehicles, except over very long distances when they move by railway or inland water-way. Mechanical transport convoys are particularly vulnerable to low-altitude attacks from the air, especially when passing through defiles and villages, over bridges, or whenever their movements become impeded.
32. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that the general rules for the conduct of mechanical transport convoys are carefully followed and that an adequate number of weapons are provided and suitably disposed throughout the convoy to meet hostile air attack. Each convoy should contain a proportion of vehicles specially prepared for defensive action and these vehicles should be distributed throughout the convoy so as to ensure the maximum fire power being brought to bear upon the attacking aircraft for the longest possible period. In order to obtain the best results the accommodation in vehicles of the personnel detailed for defensive duties must be carefully considered.
33. (i) Occasions may arise when mechanical transport convoys are compelled to follow routes which are liable to attack by ground forces. Special arrangements for protection may then be required and escorts may be necessary with the convoy.
(ii) A portion of the escort should move with the convoy and a portion should be sent ahead to secure any bridges or defiles which have to be passed.
34. The senior combatant officer with a convoy should command both the convoy and its escort. He should consult the senior transport officer on all matters which affect the welfare and convenience of the convoy and should give effect to his wishes unless, by so doing, the safety of the convoy would he endangered.
35. The duty of the commander is to effect the safe conduct of the convoy to its destination with the least delay and inconvenience ; therefore he should not engage the enemy if his task can without doing so be accomplished. If fighting is inevitable, the enemy should be engaged as far from the convoy as possible. The convoy should not be halted and parked, except as a last resort.
36. Armoured cars provide an efficient and economical form of escort for mechanical transport convoys.
37. Early information about the enemy and the roads ahead is essential. Valuable information may sometimes be procured by the use of aircraft in preliminary reconnaissance, especially in open country. Only in very exceptional circumstances should aircraft be employed on duties of escorting mechanical transport convoys.
