Allied Air Power Doctrine: Royal Air Force War Manual; Volume I - Chapter 9: Air Fighting
Strategical Principles
1. The defeat of the enemy can only be brought about by offensive action. The offensive in all forms of warfare tends to stimulate the morale and strengthen the determination of the personnel taking part, whereas the defensive tends to depress and undermine both morale and confidence. The idea underlying the efficient leadership of any force is, therefore, to seize the initiative and command of the situation by early resort to a powerful and well judged offensive which, by its determination, will cause the enemy to conform to the plans of the attacker.
2. In air warfare the strategical offensive is mainly conducted by the bomber aircraft about whom most of the fighting will centre. The operations of the fighters may more often be strategically defensive, but they must, in all circumstances, adopt the most strenuous tactical offensive possible in the conditions under which they have to fight.
3. The three dimensions in which aircraft operate, combined with the difficulty of observing other aircraft from the air in any circumstances, render it difficult to find the enemy and bring him to action. Further, as the enemy morale weakens he will usually endeavour to evade our fighter aircraft unless the tactical advantage or superiority of numbers lies with him.
4. If the enemy's intentions can be foreseen, if his lines of approach are known, or if sufficient warning of his approach can be obtained, fighter aircraft can be uneconomical and generally ineffective to send fighter aircraft up to look for an unlocated enemy. In such circumstances the air bombardment of some vulnerable and important point which the enemy will be compelled to defend is the most effective means of bringing him to action.
5. In connection with naval or military operations, the area of operations of the fighter aircraft on either side will be, to some extent, fixed by the locality of the sea or land battle, but under these conditions also, air bombardment provides an effective means of bringing to battle or diverting enemy aircraft.
Tactical Principles
6. General considerations.—Success in air fighting depends upon
(i) Simple tactical plans.
(ii) The correct selection of the tactical plan best suited to the situation.
(iii) The method of execution of the plan.
7. (i) The tactical methods to be adopted in air fighting must be evolved, developed and perfected in peace-time. These plans should be the product of experience confirmed by constant practice and experiment in tactical exercises.
(ii) To be of any permanent and practical value in war, they should be few in number and simple of execution, so that the average pilot can become thoroughly familiar with them and efficient in their practice with the minimum amount of training.
(iii) They should, therefore, be limited to those necessary to meet the varying conditions likely to be encountered in air fighting, and to suit the special tactical characteristics of the different types of aircraft which may be required to use them.
8. In formulating these tactical plans, consideration should be given in particular to concentration, co-operation, surprise and security. The application of these principles is discussed in Chapter I.
9. Selection of the tactical plan.—(i) The correct selection of the tactical plan best suited to the situation is the special responsibility of the leader or commander of the forces concerned, and will depend upon the accuracy of his judgment and faculty for quick and correct decision.
(ii) Having selected his plan of action, his decision should be conveyed to his subordinates in the quickest and simplest manner possible. Once the necessary signals are made, the leader must act with determination and avoid any appearance of hesitation or doubt which would tend to react on the whole of his command.
10. (i) Execution of the plan.—The subsequent success of the tactical plan will depend mainly upon the :—
(a) Skill and vigour of execution.
(b) Effective use of weapons.
(c) Power of manoeuvre.
Thorough familiarity with the plan, combined with high morale and confidence in the leader, will ensure a vigorous and immediate response to his orders.
(ii) The attack should be delivered with determination and pressed home to within decisive range of the enemy. A high standard of drill and discipline will tend to increase the cohesion of the attacking formation and strengthen mutual understanding, whereby it will be possible to deliver sustained or repeated attacks with a minimum of confusion or loss of control and to produce the maximum concentration of fire at the decisive point.
11. The effective use of weapons depends in the first place upon individual skill in air gunnery, and with fixed guns effective fire depends also upon quickness and accuracy in manoeuvring and handling the aircraft. The opportunities of bringing effective fire to bear upon the enemy are usually fleeting, and the ability to take the utmost advantage of such opportunities is an important factor in air fighting.
12. Where the attacking aircraft possess superior altitude, performance and manoeuvrability, these ad-vantages should be exploited to the utmost, both to gain surprise and to bring about superior concentration of fire. The formation possessing these advantages is able to take and keep the initiative and can choose both the moment to deliver or break off the attack and the direction and focus of the attack.
Factors Affecting the Fighting Tactics of Aircraft
13. (i) The fighting tactics adopted by aircraft in war are affected by their general design and armament and by the rôle in which they are employed.
(ii) Aircraft may be divided roughly into two classes—those specially designed and armed for fighting purposes, and those intended primarily for some rôle other than fighting.
(iii) The principal characteristics of the former are high performance and manoeuvrability, while the latter are designed mainly with a view to the qualities required for their special functions such as bombing, deck landing, transportation, etc.
14. In the present stage of air development, fighter aircraft may be divided generally into two classes
:(i) Single-seater fighters.
(ii) Two-seater fighters.
15. Single-seater fighters.—The single-seater fighter, being more lightly loaded, is superior to any other class of aircraft in manoeuvrability and climb, and can also be built to fly faster than any other class. Its high rate of climb renders it particularly suitable for interception purposes, and its speed and manoeuvrability favour its use in the attack. It is, in fact, essentially offensive in nature and having no rear gun is unable to fight defensively. It is, therefore, unsuitable for long distance work over enemy territory since it cannot both retire and at the same time defend itself against attack from behind. (See also Chap. VIII, para. 25.)
(ii) A further disadvantage of the single-seater fighter as at present constructed is that, as the guns are fixed in the line of flight of the aircraft, it is difficult to arrange for more than one or, at the most, two aircraft to concentrate effective fire at close range on the same target at the same time without danger of collision with each other.
(iii) Single-seater fighters cannot maintain continuous fire on an enemy without sacrificing the advantages of their superior performance.
16. Two-seater fighters.—Two-seater fighters are inferior to single-seaters as regards performance generally, but superior to other classes of aircraft. They have the advantage that they can use both their front and rear guns for offensive action, and by means of their rear guns they can co-operate with each other in formation to bring a sustained concentration of fire to bear upon the enemy, either offensively or defensively. They are, therefore, particularly suitable for offensive action against large enemy formations, and for long distance work over enemy territory.
17. (i) Effect of armament and design on air tactics.—Development in armament and design will lead to changes in air tactics. The success of a particular method of attack may be countered by the provision of armour or by the elimination of blind spots, due to improvements in design.
(ii) Introduction of guns of heavier calibre may render effective fire at long range possible. All-round fire may be improved by increasing the number of guns and gunners and reducing the interruptions of fire due to the structure of the aircraft. All these changes will tend to increase the offensive and defensive powers of air-craft and modify the tactical methods of attack and defence.
(iii) It is essential, therefore, that air fighting tactics, armament and design should be developed in close relation to one another, and that tactics should keep pace with improvements in the design of aircraft and with the introduction of new forms of armament.
18. Co-operation aircraft.—Aircraft designed primarily for co-operation with the fleet or with the army, are not usually of high performance because of the special characteristics required of them. These aircraft normally operate alone. When unaccompanied by an escort they are dependent for their tactical defence against hostile aircraft upon the individual efficiency of the pilot and gunner, and the tactics they employ may be either offensive or defensive according to the situation.
19. Bomber aircraft.—Bombers, being designed mainly for load-carrying, are inferior to fighters as regards performance and manoeuvrability, especially when loaded with bombs. Further, the aim of bombers is to reach their destination and drop their bombs on the objective, and they must not turn from this purpose to attack or pursue hostile aircraft. For these reasons the fighting tactics of bombers are mainly defensive, and they depend for their defence against enemy fighters upon an accurate and intense concentration of fire produced by a steady and suitable formation.
Air Fighting at Night
20. The same principles govern air fighting at night as by day ; only the application of them differs. Surprise is far more easily effected at night, since approach of the attacking fighter will usually be concealed by darkness. On the other hand it is easier for a bomber to evade attack at night than by day; in fact it will rarely be discovered by hostile fighters unless the latter are assisted by searchlights adequate in number and efficiency.
Air Fighting in Formation
21. Co-operation and fire power in air fighting are obtained by means of the formation, the object of which is to develop the utmost mutual support and unity of action under the control of a single leader.
22. The size of a formation is governed by the number of aircraft which can be easily controlled by one leader and which can maintain the cohesion and manoeuvrability necessary to carry out their rôle.
23. The formation such as that adopted by bomber and some times by reconnaissance aircraft for defence should normally be compact, the individual units being so arranged as to provide the highest degree of mutual support and all round fire. The power of such a formation lies in its sticking together and its capacity to maintain that unity in the face of every hostile effort to break it up. With this power must be combined the ability to open out under anti-aircraft fire and close again quickly and easily without confusion or loss of control.
24. The purely offensive formation, composed usually of single-seater fighters, is somewhat different, both in object and in method, to the defensive formation. The fighter formation is used mainly as a convenient means of control and direction.
25. When a formation of single-seater fighters is opposed by fighters of superior performance or in superior numbers, it may sometimes be advisable to maintain a rigid formation as long as possible in order to avoid the risk of being broken up and attacked in detail by a superior force. But against aircraft of inferior performance, the strength of single-seater fighters lies in the speed of their attack, in surprise and in concentration by means of rapid manoeuvre and co-operation, and their formations must therefore not be such as unduly to restrict the use of these qualities.
26. The two-seater fighter formation can operate both offensively and defensively. It may be used either as an elastic highly-manoeuvrable combination such as that used by single-seaters against a defensive formation or it may be used to develop the maximum concentration of fire from the rear guns of a compact formation such as that adopted by bombers.
Offensive Patrols by Fighter Squadrons
27. Where fighter aircraft are operating in connection with naval or military operations, their task will be to destroy the enemy's co-operation aircraft while covering and protecting the freedom of our own. Protection by direct defensive measures alone is ineffective and uneconomical. The most effective method by which fighter aircraft can protect those employed in co-operation is by taking offensive action against the enemy away from the scene of activity of their own aircraft, so as to leave them relatively undisturbed. By their energetic action the enemy's air operations will be impeded and indirect protection afforded to all our co-operating aircraft.
28. Should the enemy aerodromes be few in number and located so to allow our fighter aircraft to operate efficiently against them, the most effective method of preventing enemy air activity short of destruction of the enemy air forces by air bombardment is by maintaining fighter patrols as continuously as possible over each and all of the enemy aerodromes with the object of preventing their aircraft operating from them. Where this is impracticable the theatre of operations should be covered by a screen of offensive patrols so disposed as to intercept hostile aircraft before they can interfere with our co-operation aircraft or attack objectives within our territory. When it is necessary to adopt such methods the points referred to in Chapter VII, paras. 20 to 23 inclusive, must receive consideration.
29. (i) In order that these patrols may reap the full advantages conferred by the initiative in air fighting and also be able to make the utmost use of surprise, they should be given as much freedom of action as is compatible with the co-ordination of their operations with those of other patrols engaged upon a similar rôle.
(ii) For this reason it is inadvisable to restrict them in regard to the locality and altitude of their patrol more than is absolutely necessary. Their orders should usually be confined to the definition of their task, leaving the patrol leader full latitude, within the limits stated above, to carry out the task in his own way.
30. (i) Owing to the ease of evasion in the air, it may often be found necessary to supplement these offensive patrols by establishing two or even more lines of patrols at different altitudes.
(ii) The rôle of the rearmost of the patrol lines may be defensive, but even so, it should be given as free a hand as possible so that it may be able to adopt an energetic offensive against any enemy aircraft coming within its reach. Even when large numbers of fighter aircraft are so employed, it is not possible to prevent enemy formations and single aircraft eluding the patrols or forcing their way through them.
