US Navy: Naval Aviation Doctrine: Introduction to Naval Aviation, 1946 - Introduction
INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL AVIATION - RESTRICTED - ISSUED BY AVIATION TRAINING DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS U. S. NAVY. * JANUARY 1946 * OPNAV 33-NY-85; Chapter IX. Tactics and Flight Operations.
Chapter IX: TACTICS AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS
The theater of war is the province of strategy, the field of battle is the province of tactics.
- Sir Edward Hamley
Implicit in all tactical considerations are the numerous basic operations which every naval airman knows - such fundamentals as handling seaplanes on water, carrier landing and take-off procedures, the rendezvous and break-up, catapulting, formation flying, and the basic tactics applicable to specialized tactical operations.
These techniques are the province of flight and Fleet training, and detailed study necessarily is precluded in an introduction to the subject. Yet inasmuch as Naval Aviation is an expression of many skills and techniques, at least a cursory examination of naval aerial tactics and flight operations is necessary for an understanding of the methods by which Fleet air forces are put to tactical use.
Tactical Doctrine
Tactics may be defined as the science and art of disposing and maneuvering aircraft in action. Because of the rigid demands for exactness and uniformity in their execution, military tactics of all kinds must be clearly defined and, within reasonable limits, preclude individual departures or improvisation.
The maneuvers, formations, and disposition which form the basis of naval aerial operations are in essence tactical orders, to be universally understood within the naval air establishment and observed in a uniform manner. These tactical orders when taken together constitute tactical doctrine - to which disciplined and uniform adherence by individuals is essential for the effectiveness of the whole naval air force.
Tactical doctrine constitutes the rules of the game, so to speak; without it, tactical operations could degenerate into unregulated and uncoordinated action without discipline. plan, or method.
Tactical doctrine has been established by the Navy for all phases of aerial action and Fleet operations. Creating the most effective combat patterns for all types of aircraft and for joint use of aircraft and other Fleet forces. It covers such diverse and complex activities as task force operations, operating seaplanes in the open sea, air-sea rescue, torpedo and dive bombing, escorting bombers, night fighting. amphibious operations, taking photographs, laying mines, or even carrying mail.
The pattern of modern tactics differs widely from popularized conceptions which flourished following aviation's battle debut in World War I. Any resemblance may be considered incidental. The day of the stunting, glamorous, lone wolf of the air passed away between 1918 and 1941.
To many observers the tardiness or seeming inability of the Japanese airman to appreciate new conceptions of air tactics' cost him dearly in World War II. During much of the early period of the war he displayed a disconcerting (though fortunate) inclination to emulate the tactics of 25 years before by performing acrobatics and "making muscles" while under guns of our own Navy aerial combat teams. He demonstrated to the satisfaction of U. S. Naval aviators that pilot skill in a slow roll and individual "glamour" are not enough in the precise business of aerial fighting. The homely philosophy of "never give a sucker an even break" paid off our combat teams in rich dividends when supported by tactical superiority.
The Combat Team Principle
Modern aerial combat is distinctly a team proposition built upon team tactics. That is why the Navy's basic tactical aircraft team unit consists of as many as four and six aircraft.
In many respects a combat flight of aircraft is analogous to a football team, drilled in long-practiced plays with each man assigned a job. Only in the mind of the motion picture writer does the hero win the game alone or the pilot save the Fleet single-handed, overcoming clouds of Zeros with one machine gun and a single-action Colt revolver, frontier model. The tactics of modern warfare demand skilled tactical combat teams coordinating their efforts with close timing and finesse.
In World War I, one of the most effective plans of defense was the "Lufberry Circle," a maneuver affording excellent tail protection but overlooking entirely any offensive possibilities. Like any other purely defensive measure, it was vulnerable to swift offensive action. This philosophy of defense has also been out-moded by new aeronautical developments, particularly in the field of airframes and power plants and their tactical corollaries.
Current tactics have widened the scope of defensive action, it is true; but even more important, they have also emphasized methods for converting static defense into offensive action to capitalize on what otherwise would be an unfavorable situation. This capitalization of unfavorable situations - flexibility in formation and maneuver - is a major factor in all tactical doctrine.
Aerial tactics, furthermore, no longer may be regarded as the exclusive province of the pilot. Essential as he is, the pilot nonetheless becomes more and more a component in a skilled team which operates both in the air and on the ground. Through radar and radio communications, for example - tactical operations may in fact be directed from a carrier deck many miles from the scene of combat and beyond visual range.
Uses of Radar
Radar - radio detecting and ranging - has assumed an essential place in aerial tactical considerations. Basic tactics have been immeasurably influenced and broadened by it. In some tactical phases, particularly night fighting and aerial raid interceptions, entirely new tactics have been developed as a result of it.
One of the great new weapons of World War II, radar has simplified and made increasingly effective many previously difficult problems through its function as an all-seeing "eye." In application, it affects virtually all types of naval air and carrier operations.
Detailed treatment of the tactical and operational applications of radar is not essential to a text of this nature. For all ordinary purposes, radar may be regarded as having two general uses in Naval Aviation: as airborne radar, and in relation to the combat information center.
Radar plot
Airborne radar. This may be either the type found in the single-place fighter and operated by the pilot, or the type of installation requiring an operator for use in multi-place aircraft. Both types serve the same functions, which are:
1. Night fighting (raid interceptions)
2. Radar search
3. Pathfinding (leading flights through cloud or darkness by radar)
4. Night or cloud intruder missions over enemy airports
5. Radar bombing
6. Radar navigation
7. Radar recognition (IFF - Identification of Friend or Foe)
Night fighters spotted for action
Combat information center. The ship-board CIC utilizes radar to find and designate enemy raids, to control airborne aircraft both offensively and defensively, to control radar countermeasures (such as jamming enemy radar), for fighter direction, for search from surface and air, for navigation and piloting (such as amphibious operations), for identification and recognition of aircraft, and for all related intelligence information.
The duties of the CIC customarily are divided among various ship units in the case of a task force or other large formation at sea; and in addition, certain ships are usually assigned specific duties as radar guardships and pickets for surveillance of given areas.
Combat Information Center
Airborne Electronics
The most important airborne electronic equipment in the first two years of the war was the "Baker" radar. The Naval Research Laboratory had developed this first American airborne radar and production had been initiated prior to the war. Thirty thousand of these "Baker" airborne radars were utilized by naval aircraft, of which many were used in the patrol of the night seas in the Southwest Pacific. Even at Guadalcanal the "Tokyo Express" found that night offered no safety if a Navy plane happened to pass within 40 or 50 miles.
Navy pilots rapidly learned to pick their way between islands by radar and loran (long range navigation), to "home" electronically on their carrier, to use the radar altimeter for safe approaches and low flying, and to identify friend or foe (IFF). As a consequence, electronic equipment was produced in quantity and personnel was trained to perform attacks on shipping and shore installations through complete cover as a routine occurrence.
Electronics was not the exclusive property of the Allied powers. With German assistance, the Japanese frequently countered aircraft with radar-controlled search-lights and antiaircraft fire. Allied counter-measures were quickly developed. On Navy raids over Japan, drifting Christmas tree foil ("window") or special jamming equipment persuaded the perplexed Jap to shut down his radar for a trouble check. Too late he found his radar was still working. but his airfield was a shambles.
The Navy also pioneered in night fighting and by midwar was rapidly producing the war's only single-place night fighters which made carrier night operations possible. The ingenious night fighter radar maintains a search over a large sector of the forward night sky. Picking up an enemy plane at five miles the pilot is able to close and fire blindly. The vision and drive of the late Vice Admiral McCain was applied to the introduction of carrier night operations. The results were apparent in the later task force operations, particularly at Okinawa. In one nine-week period ninety-one enemy aircraft were "splashed" by Navy night fighters alone.
Early in the war the Navy initiated an innovation in communications for aircraft. The Bureau of Aeronautics boldly moved out of the older long waves and into ultra-high frequencies which the Jap never entered. There naval aviators enjoyed real privacy.
Exemplary of the dozens of other electronic devices produced for special purposes is the radar corner reflector developed to provide for long-range detection of tiny life rafts whose occupants might otherwise be lost.
Electronics was put to particularly effective use in antisubmarine warfare. When World War II ended, the Navy had perfected electronic listening devices to be dropped from aircraft over wide areas of the seas. Even in its early forms this device destroyed some half-dozen submarines which never even came up to see what was striking. The submarine tried to listen for searching aircraft. The Navy responded with a tricky radar gadget which convinced the submarine that the approaching airplane was actually departing. The submarine attempted to breathe under water with an intake valve known as "Schnorkee." The Navy increased the sensitivity of its radar to detect even this small object.
Electronics told carrier commanders all
