Air Fronts: Airdromes - FM-26, Defense of Airdromes - Chapter 4. Defense against Sabotage

31. CONTINUITY OF MENACE.-It can never be assumed that any area is free from the menace of the saboteur. He is as likely to be found in the combat zone as in the zone of the interior. He is likely to appear in peace as well as in war. He may be an enemy agent or a disaffected individual of friendly nationality.

32. VIGILANCE.-a. Defense against sabotage is a matter of efficient interior guard. Stationary watchmen or roving guards who avoid routine movements are more effective than sentries who follow a set method of walking post. A system of checks on the guard and general protective system should be a part of the plan. Inspections by individuals not known to the guards may reveal laxity or other defects. An officer should be detailed to make a study on ways and means of sabotage in the area and to report his conclusions to the commanding officer.

b. There should be a continuous survey of personnel who have access to the area. Means of identification should be provided for persons not in uniform, and special passes should be required for entrance into restricted areas. The duty of examining credentials should be assigned to superior guards. If the loyalty or mental balance of an individual is doubted, he should be especially watched and denied approach to sensitive areas until a true estimate of him has been obtained. Aid in forming such estimates should be sought from other agencies. On most fields aircraft will be the most valuable military equipment. Unidentified individuals must not be allowed in their vicinity except under constant surveillance. If there is the slightest possibility of any unknown individual having access to baggage, preflight checks should be routine.

33. MATERIAL OBSTACLES.-a. The work of the saboteur is greatly impeded by the use of wiring or fencing to restrict entrance and exit so that personnel can be subjected to inspection, and to isolate the more sensitive and vital installations, such as power plants or gasoline supply points. When sufficient wire is not available for these purposes, a system of signs and printed orders designed to control movement will greatly assist guards, as attention can be concentrated on any individual who disregards them.

b. In areas where it is possible to employ it, lighting lessens the possibility of sabotage at night. Guards should be provided with flashlights.

34. REFERENCE.-A discussion of methods of sabotage and protective measures is available in TM 19—225.